









“EQUITY-LIKE MANDATORY CONVERTIBLES: A CAPITAL 
RAISING ALTERNATIVE” 
 




Hybrid securities has played an important role in helping firms with their specific business strategy challenges by 
mitigating market imperfections and increasing sources of capital and costs efficiency through the deep customization 
they generally allow. In this work, I study equity-like mandatory convertible securities, its issuers’ characteristics, 
needs and challenges. These securities are dividend enhanced, automatically converted into common equity at maturity 
and have either limited or capped upside potential while fully participating in the downside losses. I find that firms 
issuing mandatory convertibles have greater non-debt tax shields and lower corporate tax rates, suggesting a tax 
exhaustion state. Issuers also display higher default probability, lower levels of internal funds, liquidity, solvency and 
financial stability and, more importantly, a deterioration of these variables close to the offering, which supports the 
choice for a safer option to raise capital whenever firms are financially troubled, highly levered and/or generally 
incapable of complying with future debt commitments. Despite some industry biasedness, some evidence shows that 
managers support their decisions on industry target benchmarks (e.g. indebtedness levels) and that equity-like 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, financial innovation has played an important role in increasing the number 
of sources of capital and the costs efficiency of raising capital. The new hybrid securities, created 
every year, allow for customization of firms’ specific needs, mitigate market imperfections and 
help issuers in their business strategy specific challenges. 
1.1 Research Question and Objectives 
In this work, I analyze equity-like mandatory convertible securities, its issuers’ characteristics, 
needs and challenges. My main objective is to understand the motivations underlying the issue of 
this specific type of securities and how these affect the issuing firms. 
These securities exist under the form of various acronyms, depending on the underwriting 
investment bank, being the two most popular forms PERCS and DECS.  
Although mandatory convertible securities feature a variety of payoff structures, they have three 
fundamental features: i) they are automatically converted into ordinary shares at maturity; ii) they 
have either limited or capped upside potential, as compared with its underlying common stock, 
while frequently participate fully in issuers’ losses, and iii) they are dividend enhanced since its 
dividend yield is typically higher than that of the underlying common stock.  
1.2 Academic Contribution 
Research about equity-like mandatory convertible securities, besides scarce and generally 
outdated, is still very fragmented, with few theoretical background and empirical support. The most 
abundant and more directly related research studies convertibles in general, preferred stock and the 
choice between debt-like and equity-like securities and/or convertibles. 
In this sense, this works aims to bring some attention and enlightening to this field of study, 
particularly to the financial innovation introduced by the specificities of equity-like mandatory 
convertible securities typical features, in terms of how they are especially able to suit firms’ specific 
needs and challenges when raising capital. 
Equity-Like Mandatory Convertibles: A Capital Raising Alternative 
7 
1.3 Structure 
This work is organized as follows: in section 2, I provide a brief theoretical framework of equity-
like mandatory convertible securities. In section 3, I link these specific instruments with the 
existing literature on mandatory convertibles, general convertibles, capital structure, trade-off 
theory and agency costs theory. In section 4, I describe the data and methodologies used in the 
empirical part of this work. In section 5, I provide the empirical results, for the hypotheses aided 
in section 3, and analyze the conclusions. Finally, in section 5, I provide a summary of the 
discussion of results and a brief conclusion. 
2. Equity-Like Mandatory Convertibles 
2.1 Ordinary Convertible Securities 
Ordinary convertibles are instruments that can be converted by its holder into the underlying 
ordinary shares at a pre-specified price and at, or before, a pre-specified date. Frequently, they can 
also be redeemed at the option of its issuer. 
In its essence, these instruments are typically under the form of preferred shares or bonds. Because 
they are convertible into common stock, these securities correlate with the movements of its 
underlying stock.  
Both convertible debt and convertible preferred stocks are hybrid instruments. In fact, these 
securities have both equity and debt features, like common stock, they benefit from the appreciation 
potential of issuer’s ordinary shares and, like bonds, they can have cash redemption at maturity and 
fixed coupon payments.  
In this sense, ordinary convertibles can be tailored to look more like bonds or more like equity. For 
instance, the higher the coupon paid, the lower the probability it will be converted and/or the lower 
the conversion price, the higher the probability it will be converted. The higher the probability of 
conversion, the more equity-like the instrument will be. 
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Figure 1 – Probability of conversion as a criterion to equity or debt behavior of convertibles 
 
Convertible securities are often referred as a mean to raise equity “through the backdoor”. The 
three main reasons firms use convertibles to raise external capital are: i) the conversion feature 
enables issuers to obtain equity financing on a deferred basis, avoiding the immediate dilution on 
old stockholders’ wealth and, partially, the often negative price reaction; ii) they generally require 
fewer covenants and preserve additional debt capacity as investors base is usually different, and 
iii) the conversion feature often allows issuers to benefit from lower coupon or dividend rates, as 
compared with non-convertible securities. 
From the issuers’ standpoint, these instruments are often referred as a useful mean to reduce the 
costs of information asymmetry, which can make equity financings particularly costly for smaller 
firms and/or firms with limited additional debt capacity. 
On the other hand, convertibles appeal to a variety of investors, with different risk profiles and 
investment goals. Common investors of convertibles are dedicated convertible funds, which look 
for upside opportunities and limited downside, hedge funds, more interested in arbitrage 
opportunities, equity funds, which use convertibles to smooth portfolio volatility, and high-yield 
funds, which typically invest in convertibles as an alternative to fixed-income investments.  
2.2 Mandatory Convertibles1 
Although mandatory convertible securities feature a variety of payoff structures and different 
denominations according to the investment bank underwriting the offer, they perform very much 
                                                          
1 The theoretical base proposed by Arzac (1997) on mandatory convertibles is mostly the starting point of this research paper and, even though I 
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like the underlying ordinary share and have three fundamental features: i) they are automatically 
converted into ordinary shares at maturity; ii) they have either limited or capped upside potential, 
as compared with its underlying common stock, but frequently participate fully in issuers’ losses, 
and iii) the dividend yield is typically higher than that of the underlying common stock.  
Like general convertible securities, mandatory convertibles also help firms reduce the costs of 
information asymmetry, allowing them to raise capital without giving away equity too cheaply, or 
paying a high interest rate on an alternative debt source.  
According to Arzac (1997), firms issuing equity-like mandatory convertibles are usually larger, 
highly leveraged and/or temporarily “financially troubled” that wants to raise capital while 
avoiding unnecessary dilution and underpricing. 
“Much as convertibles accomplish for smaller growth firms, mandatory convertibles enable large issuers with growth 
(or recovery) prospects that may not be fully reflected in their current stock prices to signal their confidence” 
(Arzac, 1997) 
Mandatory convertibles are particular appropriate to narrow the gap of information between 
investors and managers because, although they perform like the underlying ordinary shares, they 
are less sensitive than straight equity or debt to changes in risk of the issuer. There are two offsetting 
effects to changes in issuer’s risk after the issuance of such instruments: i) the claim to the 
underlying decreases in value but, ii) the option on the underlying, which is built in the convertible, 
becomes more valuable due to the higher volatility of the underlying. 2  
Some other benefits of issue mandatory convertible securities are: i) they allow firms to issue less 
costly delayed common equity; ii) they often receive a full equity credit by rating agencies and 
regulators; iii) they limit excessive financial default risk by substituting interest payments for 
dividends, which can be waived and accumulated if the firm is not able to pay them; iv) by 
promising a higher fixed income stream, in exchange for the limited upside potential, they send a 
stronger expression of confidence in firm’s future to the market; v) compared to straight equity, 
they reduce the negative signaling effect and the resulting dilution of old shareholders wealth, and 
vi) some specific mandatory convertible securities’ payoff structures can be tax deductible. 
From the demand standpoint, investors generally seek for high dividend yields, downside 
protection, capital appreciation, or some combination of these.  
                                                          
2 This is a property of convertibles in general and was first noted by Brennan and Schwartz (1988).  
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The reasons that justify the demand for mandatory convertibles are, among others, the following: 
i) compared with the underlying stocks, and even in declining interest rates and dividend yields 
environments, mandatory convertibles provide a high coupon, in exchange for limited upside 
potential and having to mandatorily convert into the underlying at a premium price, ii) investors 
are more protected in case of bankruptcy before the conversion date since mandatory convertibles 
have higher level of subordination compared to the underlying, iii) as mentioned above, compared 
with conventional equity or debt, mandatory convertibles are less sensitive to changes in issuer’s 
risk after the offer, which makes these securities useful tools to reduce information asymmetry 
between management and investors, and iv) mandatory convertibles provide both a fixed income 
stream and a capital appreciation, which can result in a greater after-tax return for taxable investors 
as compared with other fixed income securities. Some other specific advantages of mandatory 
convertibles sub-types, compared with conventional equity or debt, are presented in the respective 
sections below. 
On the issuers’ side, firms naturally seek to offer less of some or all the features investors wish. 
The role of the investment banks is therefore to design securities that falls into the set of attributes 
that satisfies both the issuers and the investors at any given point in time. This matching would 
then increase the popularity of such securities which would attract market-makers that would 
provide more liquidity and narrower bid-ask spreads. 
I describe the most relevant groups of mandatory convertibles in detail, below: 
Limited Upside Potential 
Limited upside potential mandatory convertibles typically include PERCS or PERQS (Morgan 
Stanley), STRYPES (Merril Lynch), TARGETS (Smith Barney) or YES (Goldman Sachs). Since 
the most popular form of these sub-type of mandatories are PERCS (Preferred Equity Redemption 
Cumulative Securities), these will be the focus of this section.  
PERCS are dividend enhanced mandatory convertible preferred stocks, with a typical maturity of 
three years. Its dividends are cumulative, higher than those of the underlying stock and investors 
in this instruments receive priority over common stocks in case of bankruptcy before maturity, or 
until the issuer redeems them by exercising his call option and forcing the conversion before 
maturity.  
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Since at issue this securities’ call has a strike price around 20-25% above the underlying stocks, if 
the issuer exercise his option and calls the conversion, investors gains are capped at the strike price. 
If not, upon conversion investors receive a variable fraction of the underlying, typically depending 
on its price at the time. In this sense, PERCS investors receive a higher dividend yield, as compared 
to common shareholders, at the price of fully participating in the downside losses while having 
limited upside participation. Although less common, investors can be allowed to call the conversion 
after some point in time and before the maturity. 
In terms of valuation, PERCS are made of three components: i) a dividend cash-flow received until 
maturity; ii) a ordinary share received at maturity, and iii) a call option on the underlying (issuer’s 
common stock), written to the issuer by the holder, with a strike price equal to the cap. Figure 2 
depicts the value of PERCS given the cash flow structure: 
Figure 2 – Value of PERCS 
 
PERCS issuers face a tradeoff between providing investors with a higher dividend yield or a greater 
cap. The lower the dividend yield relative to common stocks, the lower the cap accepted by 
investors. This tradeoff works within a reasonable range of values, since a too high dividend yield 
would result in cap so low that would transform PERCS in something more close to a subordinated 
note, with almost no capital gain potential. 
Upside Participating 
The most widespread mandatories falling within this category are DECS (Salomon Brothers), 
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(Goldman Sachs) or PEPS (Morgan Stanley). The most popular are DECS (Dividend Enhanced 
Convertible Stock) and the next paragraphs will focus on analyzing its features and particularities. 
Unlike PERCS, DECS do not limit capital gains in case the underlying stock appreciates, making 
them more suitable for bullish investors as compared to capped mandatories. In exchange, investors 
in these securities only start participating in the capital gains of the underlying once its price reaches 
a certain minimum threshold, higher than the price at the time of the offering. Additionally, the 
conversion ratio is variable with the maturity price, which by its turn, and similarly to Asian 
options, is calculated using the average of a certain number of trading days before the maturity 
(typically 20 days).  
Finally, as PERCS, typically DECS can be early called its issuer, and less frequently by its holder, 
and they are typically issued at the same price of the underlying common stock. The issuer company 
has in this sense the flexibility of deciding on two variables, the dividend yield and the conversion 
ratio (including the strike price of the out-of-the-money call option on the underlying stock, that is 
the price threshold), the conversion ratio itself and its progression scale (normally smaller as higher 
is the common stocks’ appreciation). 
In this context, Figure 3 depicts the tradeoff between these two variables. 
Figure 3 – Value of DECS 
 
For a higher dividend yield, and between certain minimum limits, investors will accept a higher 
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Downside Protection 
Some hybrid form of both sub-types was inevitable arranged by the always “altruistic” 
underwriting investment banks and a floor was also introduced to the DECS’s framework. This is 
more popular in Europe rather than in the US and, regardless of this downside protection, rating 
agencies also consider it equity because it does not imply cash redemption. 
This additional feature, which is basically a “knock-out warrant” also help firms signaling stronger 
confidence in the future of common stock, and therefore in their firms. Naturally, issuers of these 
hybrid form of mandatory convertibles will face a tradeoff between a lower cap and/or floor and a 
lower dividend yield or vice versa. 
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Since the modest appearing of mandatory convertibles in 1988, their popularity has heavily 
increased in the following years, in special during periods of recession.  
The reason that seems to justify this popularity is a twofold. On the one hand, these are generally 
securities that seem to help a variety of issuers to reduce costs of information asymmetry when 
raising capital, avoiding, among others, the lemon’s problem. On the other hand, these securities 
include very flexible features, that accommodate the special circumstances and needs of its 
different issuers.  
New variations of these securities every year, add increasingly flexibility, better and more creative 
tax treatments or simply a new way of taking advantage of market rules (e.g. recent earnings 
management regulations regarding dilution of EPS), but mostly, a new fancy acronym.  
Whatever the reasons that justify their popularity, mandatory convertibles have had high demand, 
both from investors and issuers, and this alone justifies the effort of investment banks to constantly 
rebrand these securities with new names and, sometimes, even new features.  
Despite its popularity in the market, this is still a very much fragmented academic field with few 
theoretical background, research, and empirical support, specifically about equity-like mandatory 
convertible securities.  
Chemmanur et al. (2003) provides an equilibrium theoretical model to justify the choice by 
mandatory convertibles, among other alternatives, and a rationale for the choice of its three main 
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features mix (conversion ratio, cap on capital appreciation and dividend yield). This model assumes 
a market characterized by asymmetric information, high costs in case of financial distress and other 
capital raising alternatives such as straight equity, straight debt and ordinary convertibles. The 
model foresees that, in equilibrium, firms are more likely to choose straight debt or ordinary 
convertibles if the level of information asymmetry is large and the probability of default is low, 
and are more likely to choose mandatory convertibles if levels of information asymmetry is lower 
and probability of financial distress is higher. Since none of the conclusions were empirically 
supported, I attempt to test some of the conclusions in this work.  
Arzac (1997) and Ramirez (2011) presents a theoretical description of PERCS, DECS and other 
mandatory convertibles, in which they explore valuation techniques and propose some 
explanations to justify the choice of these hybrid securities as a mean to raise capital.  
Arzac (1997) focus more on providing an historical contextualization, a description of the several 
types of mandatory convertibles, and the characteristics of its issuers. In his work, Arzac (1997) 
claims that firms issuing mandatory convertibles do so because these securities help them reduce 
the costs of information asymmetry and the dilution associated with equity issuances, and the 
typical firm issuing mandatory convertibles is highly levered, with high default risk and financial 
distress costs.  
On the other hand, Ramirez (2011) emphasized more the different equity-like and debt-like 
characteristics, that distinguishes the several derivatives, mandatory convertibles and other 
alternatives. Namely the author mentions how the conversion probability and the payment of a 
principal influence the equity or debt behavior in terms of fiscal treatment and, sometimes more 
importantly, the rating agencies treatment (please refer to Figure 1). The author continues by 
describing the conversion mechanisms of several real life examples.  
Regarding Arzac (1997) and Ramirez (2011) works, because these explanations were not 
empirically supported, I will challenge some of them across this work. 
Despite the scarce and, in general, outdated research on mandatory convertibles, there are 
significant research about preferred stock issuance, the choice between convertible debt and 
convertible preferred stock and more generally, about the choice between debt and equity.  
Lewis and Verwijmeren (2011) examines how firms choose fixed income claims, the method of 
payment and, occasionally, addressees equity-like mandatory convertibles specific features by 
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comparing its features with other securities’. The authors show that the choice of fixed income 
claims is mostly driven by concerns regarding corporate taxes, refinancing costs and agency costs 
while the method of payment choice depends mostly on reported earnings per share strategies. 
Finally, they show that highly levered firms, needing extra debt capacity, usually include 
mandatory conversion features.  
While Lewis and Verwijmeren (2011) base their analyses on comparing offers of several different 
types of securities, every time I challenge some of their hypotheses, I compare my sample with 
industry averages instead. I believe this technique presents a more unbiased analysis and would 
prove itself consistent every time the derived conclusions of both works points in the same 
direction.  
Similarly, Lee and Figlewicz (2000) study the characteristics of firms that issue convertible debt 
versus firms that issue convertible preferred stock. The authors’ findings are in line with, financial 
distress, tax benefits, agency and optimal structure theories. Additionally, they show that the two 
types of convertibles are issued by different groups of firms. The authors continue by arguing that 
firms with larger non-debt tax shields and higher levels of financial, operating and default risks are 
more likely to choose convertible preferred stocks. On the other hand, firms with greater free cash 
flows and growth potential, compared with the first group, are more likely to choose convertible 
debt.  
More generally, I test my sample for other economic theories, such as financial distress and 
asymmetric information problems (Stein, 1992), financial structure and signaling techniques (Ross, 
1977), tax advantages of issuing debt (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) and agency costs between 
stockholders and bondholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The inclusion of a mandatory conversion feature hugely impacts the conclusions derived from a 
decision-making and investment standpoint. Nevertheless, when appropriate and with the 
necessary adjustments, I test in this work the findings of the previously mentioned studies. 
Next I present the hypothesis I will test later in this work.  
3.1 Tax Benefits Hypothesis 
Equity-like mandatory convertibles, usually under the form of mandatory convertible preferred 
stocks, are considered equity for tax purposes and its dividend payments are not tax deductible. 
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Since interest payments generate tax shields, issuers that can benefit from these should, in general, 
prefer debt-like securities since they are a less expensive way to raise capital as compared to equity-
like alternatives. Conversely, firms that are not able to take advantage of tax shields from additional 
interest obligations should prefer equity-like mandatory convertibles. 
Lee and Figlewicz (2000) show that firms with lower levels of profits and/or firms that have lower 
marginal tax rates, are less able to take advantage of direct tax benefits from additional interest 
obligations, therefore they should find equity-like mandatory convertibles a less expensive way to 
raise capital. 
Furthermore, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that non-debt tax shields, such as depreciations 
and tax loss carryforwards, can make tax shields from additional interest obligations redundant. 
Similarly, Auerbach and Poterba (1987) argue that firms with high levels of non-debt tax shields 
are likely to be in a “tax exhaustion state” and therefore face a close to zero marginal tax rate on 
additional interest obligations.  
In summary, and as pointed out by Lee and Figlewicz (2000), larger depreciations should imply 
lower average and marginal tax rates, which ceteris paribus, should also mean that firms with high 
levels of depreciations and/or tax loss carryforwards should find mandatory convertibles a less 
expensive way of raising capital.  
To test this hypothesis, I use EBITDA Margin to measure the initial income positions while 
avoiding potential scale effects, Depreciations standardized by the level of revenues, to measure 
the level of non-debt tax shields and the Effective Corporate Tax Rate, to measure the level of 
taxation. The variables used are measured with data for the fiscal year preceding the offer.  
I expect that firms issuing mandatory convertibles will have lower EBITDA margins, higher 
depreciations, and lower effective corporate tax rates, when compared to its industry peers.  
3.2 Financial Distress Hypothesis 
The financial distress hypothesis claims that firms with higher financial distress costs will prefer 
to raise capital through the alternative that bears the lowest probability of default. Although 
underwriting costs associated with debt financing are often lower than equity issues, these 
financially troubled firms have generally weak credit profiles and/or debt covenants, which makes 
refinancing at market rates an unlikely alternative given their already tough financial constraints.  
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As previously mentioned, equity-like mandatory convertibles become an attractive option because 
these securities do not require the repayment of a principal. Moreover, they have a positive impact 
in the financial leverage and in the credit profile of its issuer because they create additional debt 
capacity, and provide highly flexible features that can better suit the specific needs of its issuer. 
Hereof, when compared to its industry peers, overall I expect to observe that the firms in my sample 
have higher bankruptcy risks, lower levels of internal funds, liquidity, solvency, and financial 
stability that is, higher indebtedness and financial leverage and lower interest coverage. 
To test for bankruptcy risk I follow Altman (1968) methodology and use his Z-Score indicator for 
the 3 years preceding the offer. As for the levels of internal funds, I use Excess Cash Margin, for 
the 3 years preceding the offer, calculated as the ratio of operating cash flow minus operating 
income to revenues. Finally, to test for liquidity and solvency levels, I use a plurality of variables, 
using information of the 3 years preceding the offer, and aiming to find consistent conclusions both 
for the short and long-term. The selected variables for the short-term liquidity are the Current Ratio 
and the Quick Ratio and for the long-term solvency, the EBIT Interest Coverage ratio, Net Debt to 
EBITDA and the Debt Service Coverage Ratio. Lastly, to test for the financial stability, and overall 
capital structure, I use Debt to Equity, Debt to Assets and Debt to Enterprise Value. 
To the extent of the tests described above, more important than the absolute values of each variable 
and their deviation to the industry peers’ averages, are the trends observed during the period 
preceding the offer. By observing a worsening of the financial status, one can conclude that equity-
like mandatory convertibles might have become a valid option for these firms given their increased 
financial distress costs whereas they were not considered a suitable option to raise capital before. 
This can also mean that mandatory convertibles are a solution of last resort for firms that exhausted 
every other solution to raise capital and are struggling to survive. 
3.3 Static Trade Off Theory 
Complementarily to the financial distress hypothesis, the static trade off theory suggests that 
whenever firms have too much debt and non-valuable tax shields, additional leverage increases can 
reduce firm value.  
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MacKIE‐MASON (1990) shows that firms with high probability of bankruptcy prefer equity issues 
rather than debt because the higher costs of financial distress exceed the tax benefits of additional 
debt. 
As a complementary test to this theory, I isolate some of the variables used to test previous 
hypothesis, namely: Depreciations, Effective Corporate Tax Rates, Altman’s Z-Score, EBIT 
Interest Coverage and Debt to Equity Ratio.  
I expect to observe that my sample of issuers includes companies with higher levels of 
depreciations and/or lower tax rates, which would show that they have limited capacity to benefit 
from tax advantages from additional debt. Lower Z-Scores and Interest Coverage Ratios and higher 
Debt to Equity Ratios, would show high levels of financial distress costs. 
Finally, Huckins (1999) suggests that market response to equity issuances should be most positive 
for firms with high levels of indebtedness and overall financial risk. I test this by comparing the 
buy-and-hold 52 Week Abnormal Returns of issuers common stocks, in the period following the 
offer, to issuers’ Altman’s Z-Score, EBIT Interest Coverage and Debt to Equity Ratios of the period 
preceding the offer. I would expect to find a negative correlation between these two variables. 
3.4 Optimal Capital Structure Hypothesis 
Research shows that managers tend to make decisions based on industry target benchmarks. 
Specifically, the optimal capital structure theory suggests that managers tend to pursue target 
indebtedness ratios, comparing their firms with its respective industry averages.  
Billingsley et al. (1994) show evidence that cross-sectional differences in capital structure are 
justified by industry averages. Thus, in an effort to converge to industry target levels, I would 
expect that firms with higher leverage ratios, as compared to its industry peers, are more likely to 
issue equity than debt.  
I test my sample for this hypothesis, by comparing the deviations of my sample firms Debt to 
Equity Ratios to its industry peers, in the one year following the offer to the same variable in the 
three years preceding the offer. 
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3.5 Staged-Investment Hypothesis 
Mayers (1998) shows that firms with sequential financing needs are more likely to issue convertible 
debt. The author argues that matching the maturity of such convertibles with the time when the 
firm needs a new round of financing lowers the financing costs and create extra debt capacity at 
the time the firm most needs.  
Equity-like mandatory convertible securities would suit even better these firms with sequential 
financing needs, because with those, firms would have more predictability over financial distress 
costs, which could be triggered by an early conversion with cash redemption.  
Following Mayers’ argument, and as pointed out in Lewis and Verwijmeren (2011) work, unlike 
convertible debt, with equity-like mandatory convertible securities the timing of conversion to 
equity is certain, as is the non-repayment of principal. Therefore, the extra debt capacity created 
by mandatory convertibles is certain, unlike in any other type of non-mandatory convertibles. 
Following the methodology of Lewis and Verwijmeren (2011), I would expect that firms with large 
future investment requirements anticipate their need of new financing through the use of equity-
like mandatory convertibles.  
Since future investment is not observable, I use Capital Expenditures in the year preceding the offer 
as a proxy for future investment, and would expect to find higher levels of this variable for my 
sample of issuers as compared with its industry peers. 
3.6 Cash-Flow Shortage Theory 
Earlier I hypothesized that highly leveraged companies are more likely to choose equity over debt 
when raising capital and that financially trouble firms would prefer mandatory convertibles due to 
its lower risk of default.  
However, and as pointed out by Huckins (1999) in his work on mandatory convertibles, Ross 
(1977) shows that debt levels and firm values are positively correlated because they are signaling 
the market that they will be able to comply with their debt commitments.  
Conversely, Miller and Rock (1985) show that external capital raising generally have a negative 
signaling effect on the market since they anticipate cash flow shortages. 
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This hypothesis implies that equity-like mandatory convertibles would be bad news, but since they 
have often attached a high dividend yield, the negative signaling effect should be neutralized by 
this form of market signaling that the firm as the capacity of fulfill this level of fixed payment.  
To test the signaling effect of issuing mandatory convertibles, I look to the 52 week stock abnormal 
returns in the post offer period, the offer’s dividend yield and the operating cash flows 
(standardized by revenues level) in the three years preceding the offer and in the year of the offer.  
I expect to observe a decline in operating cash flows before the offer, which would cause the need 
to raise capital, and positive correlation between the offered dividend yield and post-announcement 
stock abnormal returns. 
3.7 Pecking Order Theory 
Akerlof (1995) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, in the peaking order model, a new equity 
issue is discounted by the market as a “lemon” because the market believes management has 
privileged information and the stock price should be peaking. 
Arzac (1997) goes further and argues that mandatory convertibles help to reduce costs of 
information asymmetry, that often makes equity issues more expensive for firms with little 
additional debt capacity, or financially troubled. Arzac (1997) continues by arguing that these 
securities also enable firms with growth or recovery prospects to signal their confidence to the 
market, avoiding this way the equity as a “lemon” problem. 
In a world with information asymmetry, firms in need of external funds and aiming to maximize 
shareholder’s value, would anticipate market’s response, and prefer its safest alternative available 
to raise capital, with straight equity being the riskiest. As equity-like mandatory convertibles are 
safer than common equity, they should rank before common equity, and therefore should not be as 
much discounted as the latter. 
I hypothesize that, the market response in the post-offer period should be most positive when 
issuer’s common equity is underpriced before the offering, showing that equity-like mandatory 
convertibles attenuates the lemon’s problem.  
To test this, I compare abnormal returns up to three years before the offer with abnormal returns 
up to one year after the offering. 
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4. Data and Methodologies 
This section presents the sample selection methodology as well a sample summary statistics 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Table 1 – Data Filters Summary 
Data filters applied to issues of convertible securities collected from SDC Platinum. Filters include the match with information retrieved from 
Thomson Reuters Database (Eikon and Datastream), Compustat and SEC. Number of Events refers to the number of issuances remaining after the 
application of each filter 
 
The convertible issues were retrieved from SDC Platinum Database for the years 2005 through 
2015 and made by firms based in the United States of America. Table 1 shows that, in this first 
stage, I obtain 2664 events from SDC Platinum database for a total of around $785 billion.  
I then impose a number of data filters. The first filter reduces my sample to 2593 offers and requires 
all issues to be made in US Dollars, which is in accordance with the preliminary filter imposed 
directly in SDC Platinum database of only USA issuers.  
Secondly, I exclude issues made by firms belonging to the financial and real estate industries, by 
filtering the 2-digit SIC codes I intend to exclude (52, 53, 55 and BC). This is because convertibles 
issued by financial firms are mostly synthetic products and REITS are essentially tax-exempt firms 
with several restrictions on dividends payouts, which would severely bias the test of my 
hypotheses. This filter reduces my sample to 1594 offers.  
The third filter imposes a “mandatory conversion” flag, one of the data fields exported from SDC 
Platinum database. This filter leaves me with 69 remaining offers.  
The fourth filter I apply imposes the existence of financial data for the three years preceding the 
offer and also for the 52 weeks after the offer, both for the issuing firms and the correspondent 
deals. This filter is accomplished through the match of the remaining events, and its issuers, with 
data from Thomson Reuters (Eikon and Datastream) and Compustat databases. This reduces my 
sample to 42 events.  
Filter Phase Number of Events Filters Description
1 2664 Total number of convertible issues retrieved from SDC Platinum Database between 2005 and 2015
2 2593 Currency: Issues in US Dollars
3 1594 Non-financial Industries: Issuers with 2-digit SIC other than 52, 53, 55 or BC
4 69 Mandatory Conversion: Issues with mandatory conversion flag (SDC Platinum)
5 42 Data Availability: Events with Thomson Reuters and Compustat match
6 31 Manual Filter: SEC fillings manual review
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Finally, I manually screened the 42 SEC filings corresponding to the offers remaining and cross-
checked the previous applicable filters once more. This final filter reduces my sample to 31 events 
totaling around $18 billion. Its summary statistics can be found in Table 3. 
In order to have data I could compare my sample to, I then collected additional data for my sample 
issuers’ industries from Thomson Reuters (Eikon and Datastrem) and Compustat databases. This 
financial data was screened by values in US Dollars and exported only for firms based in the United 
States of America.  
This data was further grouped by SIC code and each financial variable’s average matched with my 
final sample firms, for the period under analysis. The industry correspondence is presented in Table 
2 
Table 2 – Industry SIC Codes Correspondence 
 
4.2 Summary Statistics 
In this section I present the most relevant summary statistics for my sample of 31 equity-like 
mandatory convertible securities’ offers.  
Table 3 presents final sample’s summary statistics, Figure 4 plots the evolution, in terms of value, 
of the mandatory convertible securities issuances in the US market across the period under analysis 
(2005-2015) and finally, Figure 5 adds an additional layer of detail to Figure 4, by including 
industry disaggregation for both absolute and relative values. 
Issuers’ Characteristics 
Table 3 presents the 26 firms that issued a total of 31 mandatory convertible securities in the US 
market between 2005 and 2015. These issuances sum up to c$18 billion and are made of 18 PERCS, 
Industry 2-digit SIC Code # Events # Issuing Firms
Energy 21 5 5
Utilities 22 10 8





Telecommunication 51 2 2
Technology 54 1 1
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12 PRIDES and 1 DECS. Regarding the issuers, and bearing in mind that all financial firms and 
REITS were excluded, my final sample includes 10 offers made by 8 Utilities firms and 5 offers 
made by 5 Energy firms. The remaining offers were made by firms either from Construction, 
Manufacturing, Retail Trade, Telecommunication, Technology or Healthcare industries. More 
information about the disaggregation by industry of the offers can be found in Table 2 and Figure 
5. 
Issue size, compared with issuer’s market value before the offer, range from 0.9% (Anadarko 
Petroleum Corp) to 70.4% (Kinder Morgan inc) and its average stood at 11.4% or an average 
principal of $ 569 million.  
As for the dividend yields offered in these issuances, values range from 4.8% (Tyson Foods Inc) 
to 11.1% (Frontier Communications Group) with an average of 6.6%. If compared with common 
stock’s dividend yields, these are clearly inferior, with values ranging from 0% to 8.5%, an average 
of 1.8% and a median even lower of 0.9%.  
In terms of credit profile, Altman’s Z-Scores depicts generally troubled firms, with values ranging 
from -0.2 (Tenet HealthCare Corp) to 7.1 (Stericycle Inc) and an average of 1.8, which is exactly 
the breakpoint of the distress zone in terms of bankruptcy probability.  
Finally, in terms of use of proceeds, the biggest slice of my sample (19 firms) claimed they intend 
to use the proceeds for general purposes, which is usually perceived as investments in firm’s 
liquidity (working capital, reduce short-term debt, capex, etc.), 6 firms showed intention of using 
the proceeds to finance acquisitions, 5 firms to reduce indebtedness and one firm to finance an 
investment opportunity.  
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Table 3 – Sample Summary Statistics 
Final sample summary statistics. The events presented were primarily collected from SDC Platinum database and later supported with data from 
Thomson Reuters database (EIKON and Datastream) and Compustat. Finally, all the applicable variables were cross-checked through the 
corresponding SEC filings and the adjusted accordingly. 
 
a "PERCS" stands for Preference Equity Redemption Cumulative Stock, "PRIDES" for Preferred Redeemable Increased Dividend Equity Security 
and "DECS" for Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock. 
b "Issue Size" equals issue's principal amount divided by market value of issuer before the offer. 
c Z-Score refers to the Altman Z-Score of the last 12 months preceding the offer. The base sample utilized for the calculation of such indicator 
considers a division of manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Generally, firms with a score above 3.0 have a low probability of bankruptcy, 
and those with a Z-Score of less than 1.8 have a relatively high probability of bankruptcy. 
Trends in the issuance of mandatory convertible securities 
Although my sample is considerably larger than those obtained in previous studies (typically less 
than half the number of events of my sample), which can be a good predictor of the increase of 
popularity among these hybrid instruments, my sample and period of analysis is still rather small 
to enable the inference of valid industry wide conclusions.  























c Use of 
Proceeds
AmSurg Corp 62 Healthcare PERCS 2014 150 10.1 5.3 0.0 3.4 Acquisition
Anadarko Petroleum Corp 21 Energy PRIDES 2015 400 0.9 7.5 1.2 2.5 Gen. Purpose
Beazer Homes USA Inc 23 Construction DECS 2010 50 5.5 7.5 0.0 2.0 Gen. Purpose
Beazer Homes USA Inc 23 Construction PRIDES 2010 75 5.5 7.3 0.0 2.0 Gen. Purpose
Beazer Homes USA Inc 23 Construction PRIDES 2012 100 7.8 7.5 0.0 1.8 Gen. Purpose
Bristow Group Inc 48 Retail Trade PERCS 2006 200 24.6 5.5 7.2 4.4 Gen. Purpose
Chesapeake Energy Corp 21 Energy PERCS 2006 500 4.8 6.3 1.9 2.1 Gen. Purpose
Cliffs Natural Resources Inc 21 Energy PERCS 2013 675 13.0 7.0 0.0 1.9 Gen. Purpose
Dominion Resources Inc 22 Utilities PRIDES 2014 900 2.2 6.4 3.5 1.8 Gen. Purpose
Dynegy Inc 22 Utilities PERCS 2014 400 12.7 5.4 0.0 1.2 Gen. Purpose
Exelon Corp 22 Utilities PRIDES 2014 1,150 3.8 6.5 3.8 1.4 Gen. Purpose
Frontier Communications Corp 51 Telecommunication PERCS 2015 1,750 34.3 11.1 8.5 0.8 Acquisition
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co 32 Manufacturing PERCS 2011 435 12.2 5.9 0.9 1.8 Reduce Debt
Huntsman Corp 32 Manufacturing PERCS 2005 250 7.4 5.0 3.7 1.3 Gen. Purpose
Kinder Morgan Inc 48 Retail Trade PERCS 2015 1,568 70.4 9.8 2.2 2.0 Reduce Debt
Kindred Healthcare Inc 62 Healthcare PRIDES 2014 150 11.7 7.5 4.3 1.2 Reduce Debt
NextEra Energy Inc 22 Utilities PRIDES 2010 345 1.5 7.0 2.5 1.3 Gen. Purpose
NextEra Energy Inc 22 Utilities PRIDES 2012 600 2.2 5.6 2.5 1.4 Gen. Purpose
NextEra Energy Inc 22 Utilities PRIDES 2015 700 1.6 6.4 2.5 1.6 Proj. Finance
NRG Energy Inc 22 Utilities PERCS 2006 500 12.7 5.8 3.1 1.8 Acquisition
PNM Resources Inc 22 Utilities PRIDES 2005 215 13.3 6.8 2.7 1.5 Gen. Purpose
PPL Corp 22 Utilities PRIDES 2011 850 7.5 8.8 4.0 1.7 Reduce Debt
Rite Aid Corp 44 Retail Trade PERCS 2005 113 6.1 7.0 0.0 0.3 Gen. Purpose
Rite Aid Corp 44 Retail Trade PERCS 2005 115 5.0 5.5 0.0 0.3 Gen. Purpose
Southwestern Energy Co 21 Energy PERCS 2015 1,500 17.1 6.3 0.0 0.7 Reduce Debt
Stericycle Inc 22 Utilities PERCS 2015 700 5.8 5.3 0.0 7.1 Acquisition
Tenet Healthcare Corp 62 Healthcare PERCS 2009 300 10.7 7.0 0.0 -0.2 Gen. Purpose
T-Mobile US Inc 51 Telecommunication PERCS 2014 870 3.8 5.5 0.0 0.3 Gen. Purpose
Tyson Foods Inc 31 Manufacturing PRIDES 2014 1,500 11.3 4.8 0.8 5.1 Acquisition
Unisys Corp 54 Technology PERCS 2011 225 14.1 6.3 0.0 1.1 Gen. Purpose
WPX Energy Inc 21 Energy PERCS 2015 350 15.4 6.3 0.0 1.1 Acquisition
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In this sense, I present below a brief analysis of some of the most flagrant industry trends during 
this period which, given its statistical validity, the reader should interpret with caution and not 
necessarily as universally transposable to other time periods or markets. 
Figure 4 – Value of Mandatory Convertibles in the US Market (2005-2015) 
 
As presented by Figure 4, the total value of mandatory convertible offers in the US market 
increased significantly in the last 2 years of my period of analysis, adding to around 69% of total 
sample issuances. Moreover, the same metric was rather small in the 2 years immediately after the 
beginning of the 2008 crisis, totaling only 4%.  
The evolution of values does not seem indicative of a gain in popularity across the period since 
there are no defined positive trend. Nevertheless, conclusions can be biased by the financial crisis 
of 2008. 
Figure 5 – Value of Mandatory Convertibles in the US Market per Industry (2005-2015) 
 
Figure 5 shows that, in addition to being the most representative industry in the mandatory 
convertibles market during the period under analysis, both in absolute and relative values, the 
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mandatories in 7 of the 10 years analyzed. In contrast, the least participant industries are 
Construction ($ 225 million) and Technology ($ 225 million).  
It seems clear the existence of a structural break around 2007/2008, years in which there was no 
issuance of mandatories. Moreover, it is visible the increased participation of more and different 
industries from this point in time onwards, with also more and larger issuances.  
5. Discussion of Results 
In this section I examine the results of the tests performed on the hypotheses presented in section 
5. The hypotheses tested are sorted as following: 5.1) Tax Benefits Hypothesis; 5.2) Financial 
Distress Hypothesis; 5.3) Static Trade Off Theory; 5.4) Optimal Capital Structure Hypothesis; 5.5) 
Staged-Investment Hypothesis; 5.6) Cash-Flow Shortage Theory, and 5.7) Pecking Order Theory 
5.1 Tax Benefits Hypothesis 
Larger depreciations should imply lower average and marginal tax rates, which ceteris paribus, 
should also mean that firms with high levels of depreciations and/or tax loss carryforwards should 
find mandatory convertibles a less expensive way of raising capital.  
Table 4 – Tax Benefits Hypothesis 
Deviations of sample firms averages from its industry averages using data relative to the end of the fiscal year preceding the issuance of equity-like 
mandatory convertible securities by the sample firms. EBITDA Margins are computed using EBITDA and Total Revenues provided by Thomson 
Reuters. Depreciations are Depreciation Expenses standardized by Total Revenues provided by Thomson Reuters. Tax Rates are Effective Tax 
Rates provided by SDC Platinum and Thomson Reuters. All deviations are calculated over arithmetic averages and blank values are not considered 
as an occurrence. Relative standard errors are calculated as standard error of mean divided by mean and expressed as percentage. 
 
*** Indicates a relative standard error inferior to 10%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 10% and 50%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 50% and 100%. 
The results for the EBITDA Margins are mixed and seems to suggests influence by industry 
specificities since deviations’ magnitude is substantial.  
Industry N EBITDA Margin Depreciations Tax Rate
Construction 3 -22.4 p.p.*** 0.4 p.p. *** -27.0 p.p. *
Energy 5 17.8 p.p.*** 5.8 p.p. ** -4.6 p.p. ***
Healthcare 3 -9.6 p.p.*** -0.1 p.p. ** -28.5 p.p. **
Manufacturing 3 -7.4 p.p.* -0.9 p.p. * -25.3 p.p. ***
Retail Trade 4 15.5 p.p.*** 4.5 p.p. ** -17.7 p.p. ***
Technology 1 -2.8 p.p. 1.0 p.p. * -21.4 p.p. ***
Telecommunications 2 -6.6 p.p.** 6.4 p.p. ** -0.3 p.p. **
Utilities 10 2.7 p.p.**** 8.9 p.p. ** 29.4 p.p. ***
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Consistent with Auerbach and Poterba (1987), results for Depreciations seems to support the 
hypothesis that higher non-debt tax shields, such as depreciations, play a role in how firms raise 
capital. Specifically, they are more likely to choose equity-like mandatory convertible securities. 
Although not shown in Table 4, data shows that deviations of sample’s average depreciations from 
its industry peers are most positive for industries with more weight of depreciations to revenues, 
which brings more consistency to my previous conclusions.  
Finally, Table 4 shows that firms with lower Effective Corporate Tax Rates, as compared to its 
industry peers, are more likely to choose mandatory convertible securities. Similarly, and as it 
would be expected, deviations of this variable are larger for firms with lower profit levels and 
higher depreciations (except for Utilities, where although our sample shows higher profitability, 
also shows higher depreciations compared to its industry benchmark).  
Apart from the mixed results found in the profitability levels, these results are consistent with the 
tax benefits theory and with Lee and Figlewicz (2000) previous findings. 
5.2 Financial Distress Hypothesis 
The financial distress hypothesis claims that firms with higher financial distress costs will prefer 
to raise capital through the alternative that bears the lowest probability of default. 
Bankruptcy Risk 
Altman’s Z-Score is a metric commonly used as a bankruptcy predictor and, however there are 
other important factors to take into consideration, values for this variable below 1.8 generally 
suggests financial distress and high likelihood of bankruptcy.  
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Table 5 – Bankruptcy Risk 
Values for sample firms, its industry peers, and deviations of the former to the latter using data relative to the end of the three fiscal years preceding 
the issuance of equity-like mandatory convertible securities by the sample firms. Zscore variable refers to Altman’s Z-Score provided by Thomson 
Reuters EIKON. Values of Zscore below 1.8 are classified “distress zone”, between 1.8 and 2.99 “grey zone” and above 2.99 “safe zone”. Relative 
standard errors are calculated as standard error of mean divided by mean and expressed as percentage. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error inferior to 10%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 10% and 50%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 50% and 100%. 
For this metric, data shows that issuing firms are either below or close to this threshold in the year 
preceding the offer. Furthermore, apart from the manufacturing, which presents very large relative 
standard errors in all years, and the healthcare industry, all other issuers are below its industry 
averages.  
As for the change in the years preceding the offer, there is a general deterioration of this score as 
closer the firms are from the issue year. This indicates a worsening of its financial situation and 
most likely an increase of the financial distress costs. If we control these trends for benchmark 
firms, results become more mixed, nevertheless sample firms seem to deteriorate more than its 
industry peers.  
These results are consistent with my hypothesis that firms with high financial distress costs prefer 
to raise capital using safer securities, being equity-like mandatory convertibles our benchmark 
security in this comparative analysis.  
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2
Sample 2.0 *** 2.6 ** 4.7 ** -0.6 -2.1
Bench. 4.6 ** 4.3 ** 4.6 ** 0.4 -0.4
Dev. -2.7 -1.7 0.0 -1.0 -1.7
Sample 1.6 ** 2.8 ** 3.8 ** -1.1 -1.1
Bench. 4.0 * 8.9 * 31.0 * -4.9 -22.1
Dev. -2.4 -6.1 -27.2 3.8 21.0
Sample 1.5 ** 1.3 ** 1.7 ** 0.1 -0.4
Bench. -0.4 2.1 * -0.8 * -2.5 2.8
Dev. 1.9 -0.7 2.5 2.6 -3.2
Sample 2.3 3.1 3.3 -0.8 -0.2
Bench. -2.8 -32.3 -33.8 29.5 1.4
Dev. 5.1 35.5 37.1 -30.4 -1.6
Sample 1.8 ** 2.5 ** 0.9 ** -0.8 1.7
Bench. 8.6 * 8.0 * 7.4 0.5 0.6
Dev. -6.8 -5.5 -6.6 -1.3 1.1
Sample 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 0.0
Bench. 21.3 ** 18.7 ** 5.9 ** 2.6 12.9
Dev. -21.3 -18.7 -5.8 -2.6 -12.9
Sample 0.2 ** 0.4 ** 0.4 ** -0.2 0.1
Bench. 4.3 3.9 0.1 0.4 3.8
Dev. -4.1 -3.5 0.3 -0.6 -3.7
Sample 0.1 ** 0.2 ** 0.2 ** 0.0 0.0
Bench. 0.2 * 0.3 ** 0.3 ** -0.1 0.0
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Financial Slack 
Firms with low levels of internal funds are less likely to incur in future debt commitments due to 
their greater inability to satisfy the resultant debt service obligations.  
In this sense, I assume that the levels of excess cash in the years preceding the offer are a good 
proxy for future availability of funds, in a scenario where firms did not raise any capital.  
Table 6 – Financial Slack 
Values for sample firms, its industry peers, and deviations of the former to the latter using data relative to the end of the three fiscal years preceding 
the issuance of equity-like mandatory convertible securities by the sample firms. Excess Cash Mg variable refers to the ratio of operating cash flow 
minus operating income to revenues and is presented in %. Input values to this variable are provided by Compustat and Thomson Reuters EIKON. 
Changes in Excess Cash Mg over the period under analysis are presented in percentage points. Relative standard errors are calculated as standard 
error of mean divided by mean and expressed as percentage. 
 
*** Indicates a relative standard error inferior to 10%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 10% and 50%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 50% and 100%. 
Results for this variable show both a worsening of the level of internal funds, as firms approach 
the issue date, and a consistent negative deviation from its industry peers’ internal funds.  
In this regard, I find support in the data for my hypothesis since firms raising funds through 
securities that do not imply future cost commitments have lower levels of internal funds as 
compared with industry benchmarks. 
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2
Sample 20.8 *** 50.1 ** 30.0 *** -58.5 66.8
Bench. 71.2 * 52.8 * 57.6 * 34.9 -8.4
Dev. -50.4 -2.7 -27.6 -93.4 75.2
Sample 34.3 *** 42.0 ** 43.2 ** -18.4 -2.6
Bench. 202.5 * 65.1 * 248.9 * 211.3 -73.9
Dev. -168.2 -23.0 -205.7 -229.6 71.2
Sample 11.5 *** 12.5 *** 11.5 *** -7.8 8.7
Bench. 32.0 * 48.7 * 19.8 * -34.3 146.4
Dev. -20.5 -36.2 -8.3 26.4 -137.6
Sample 4.0 *** 6.0 *** -1.2 *** -34.4 -588.7
Bench. 2516.3 479.4 585.6 424.9 -18.1
Dev. -2512.4 -473.4 -586.8 -459.3 -570.5
Sample 5.3 *** 14.3 *** 24.9 -63.1 -42.3
Bench. 2.5 ** 3.2 ** 3.8 -22.0 -14.3
Dev. 2.8 11.1 21.1 -41.1 -28.0
Sample 2.5 *** 4.7 *** 7.8 *** -47.0 -39.1
Bench. 2131.2 * 1874.3 * 588.5 * 13.7 218.5
Dev. -2128.7 -1869.6 -580.7 -60.8 -257.6
Sample 19.1 *** 42.9 ** 37.6 *** -55.5 14.0
Bench. 431.1 * 392.4 * 12.6 * 9.9 3016.0
Dev. -412.0 -349.5 25.1 -65.4 -3002.0
Sample 13.9 *** 15.9 *** 20.4 *** -12.5 -22.3
Bench. 15.1 * 28.2 * 27.4 * -46.3 2.9
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Liquidity 
The variables used aim to assess on firms’ capacity to fulfill short-term financial obligations (within 
one year), being that, by analyzing both current and quick ratios, I intend to overcome potential 
biasedness introduced by inventories’ liquidity, which could differ from industry to industry and is 
therefore avoided by the quick ratio (also known as acid-test ratio). These metrics also bring more 
consistency to my analysis of internal funds, specifically in the shorter-term.  
Table 7 – Liquidity 
Values for sample firms, its industry peers, and deviations of the former to the latter using data relative to the end of the three fiscal years preceding 
the issuance of equity-like mandatory convertible securities by the sample firms. Current Ratio variable refers to the ratio of total current assets to 
total current liabilities and Quick Ratio refers to the ratio of total current assets minus inventories to total current liabilities. Input values to this 
variable are provided by Thomson Reuters EIKON. Changes in the variables over the period under analysis are presented in absolute values. Data 
for construction industry is not available for these variables. Relative standard errors are calculated as standard error of mean divided by mean and 
expressed as percentage. 
 
*** Indicates a relative standard error inferior to 10%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 10% and 50%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 50% and 100%. 
In the year preceding the offer, although values for Current Ratio are not very clear, they are mostly 
in line with the benchmark for most of the industries. On the other hand, Quick Ratio deviations 
from the benchmark are more pronounced and negative, which supports my hypothesis. 
As for the two and three years before the offer, both variables show a larger negative deviation 
from its industry peers, which also supports my hypothesis. 
Regarding the trends of these two variables over the years preceding the offer, results are mixed 
for the year immediately preceding the issuance but the years before show more conclusive trends, 
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2
Sample 0.8 ** 1.1 ** 1.7 ** -0.3 -0.3 0.8 ** 0.9 ** 1.5 ** -0.1 -0.4
Bench. 1.4 ** 1.4 ** 1.5 ** 0.0 -0.1 2.4 ** 2.5 ** 2.5 ** 0.0 0.0
Dev. -0.6 -0.3 0.2 -28.2 -27.7 -1.6 -1.6 -1.1 -5.1 -40.3
Sample 1.5 ** 1.4 ** 1.6 ** 0.1 -0.1 1.6 ** 1.6 ** 1.8 ** 0.0 -0.1
Bench. 1.4 ** 1.4 ** 1.4 ** 0.0 0.0 1.8 ** 2.0 ** 1.8 ** -0.1 0.1
Dev. 0.0 -0.1 0.1 6.4 -12.9 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 13.1 -19.2
Sample 1.6 ** 1.8 1.7 -0.1 0.0 1.0 *** 1.2 1.0 -0.1 0.2
Bench. 1.8 ** 1.8 ** 1.6 ** 0.0 0.1 2.6 ** 2.4 ** 2.0 ** 0.1 0.2
Dev. -0.2 0.0 0.1 -11.1 -10.3 -1.6 -1.3 -1.0 -20.2 -3.4
Sample 0.6 *** 0.7 *** 0.7 -0.1 0.0 1.2 *** 1.2 *** 0.6 0.0 0.9
Bench. 1.5 ** 1.5 ** 1.5 ** 0.0 0.0 1.0 ** 1.0 ** 1.0 ** 0.0 0.0
Dev. -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -4.4 -5.8 0.2 0.2 -0.4 -1.4 88.6
Sample 1.4 *** 1.2 *** 1.1 *** 0.1 0.1 1.3 *** 1.2 *** 1.1 *** 0.2 0.1
Bench. 1.4 ** 1.5 ** 1.3 ** 0.0 0.1 3.1 ** 3.3 ** 2.7 ** -0.1 0.2
Dev. 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 19.3 -2.2 -1.7 -2.1 -1.7 21.7 -9.6
Sample 1.9 * 1.0 ** 2.0 0.8 -0.5 1.5 * 1.1 ** 2.2 * 0.4 -0.5
Bench. 1.9 ** 1.8 ** 1.7 ** 0.0 0.1 2.6 ** 2.6 ** 2.4 ** 0.0 0.1
Dev. 0.0 -0.8 0.3 77.8 -55.1 -1.1 -1.5 -0.2 35.4 -59.6
Sample 0.9 ** 0.9 ** 0.8 *** 0.1 0.1 1.0 ** 1.1 ** 0.8 ** -0.1 0.3
Bench. 1.0 ** 1.0 ** 1.0 ** 0.0 0.0 1.0 ** 1.0 ** 1.0 ** 0.0 0.0
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being them negative, which supports the hypothesis of financial deterioration as the issuers get 
closer to the issue date. 
Overall, I conclude that results for the year immediately before the offer are fairly mixed but, the 
same variables for the years before that, support my hypothesis that firms choosing to raise capital 
through equity-like mandatory convertibles have lower levels of liquidity before the issuance in 
general, and experience a liquidity deterioration as closer they get to the issue date. 
Solvency 
To further examine firms’ ability to incur in future financial costs I turn now to analyze EBIT 
Interest Coverage Ratios and Debt Service Coverage Ratios, which provide a more long-term 
picture of firms’ financial cushion to support future debt service commitments.  
Table 8 – Solvency 
Values for sample firms, its industry peers, and deviations of the former to the latter using data relative to the end of the three fiscal years preceding 
the issuance of equity-like mandatory convertible securities by the sample firms. EBIT Int. Cov. Ratio refers to EBIT Interest Coverage Ratio and 
is computed as the ratio of EBIT to Interest Expenses. Debt Serv. Cov. Ratio refers to Debt Service Coverage Ratio and is computed as the ratio of 
Net Income to Total Debt Service, having that Total Debt Service includes total debt obligations due within one year, as interest, principal, sinking-
fund and lease payments. Input values to these ratios are provided by Thomson Reuters EIKON and Compustat. Changes in the variables over the 
period under analysis are presented in absolute values. Relative standard errors are calculated as standard error of mean divided by mean and 
expressed as percentage. 
 
*** Indicates a relative standard error inferior to 10%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 10% and 50%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 50% and 100%. 
Results show large relative standard errors for both variables, especially in the sample of issuers.  
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2
Sample -0.1 2.9 2.3 -3.0 0.6 -24.7 -12.0 -12.3 -12.7 0.3
Bench. 18.8 * 22.4 * 14.3 * -3.6 8.1 -1.4 ** -4.1 * -2.2 * 2.7 -1.9
Dev. -19.0 -19.5 -12.1 0.6 -7.5 -23.3 -7.9 -10.1 -15.4 2.2
Sample 18.8 193.4 18.7 -174.6 174.6 -0.2 3.3 3.6 -3.4 -0.3
Bench. 56.7 2.5 16.1 * 54.3 -13.6 2.8 * 2.5 ** 2.4 ** 0.3 0.1
Dev. -38.0 190.9 2.6 -228.8 188.3 -3.0 0.8 1.1 -3.8 -0.4
Sample 5.0 6.8 6.1 -1.8 0.7 0.3 0.2 -1.4 0.1 1.6
Bench. 28.2 * 53.5 * 57.1 * -25.3 -3.6 0.8 * 0.9 * 0.8 * -0.1 0.0
Dev. -23.2 -46.7 -50.9 23.5 4.3 -0.5 -0.7 -2.2 0.2 1.6
Sample 4.1 2.2 3.8 1.9 -1.6 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.4
Bench. 70.8 * -86.3 63.9 * 157.1 -150.3 3.3 * 2.9 * 3.7 * 0.4 -0.8
Dev. -66.6 88.5 -60.1 -155.2 148.6 -3.1 -2.7 -3.1 -0.4 0.4
Sample 1.7 3.5 ** 2.1 -1.9 1.4 0.7 0.9 0.1 -0.3 0.8
Bench. 96.9 * 63.5 * 38.9 * 33.4 24.5 1.9 ** 1.9 ** 1.6 ** 0.1 0.2
Dev. -95.2 -60.0 -36.9 -35.2 -23.1 -1.3 -0.9 -1.5 -0.3 0.6
Sample 3.7 *** 3.5 *** 0.0 *** 0.2 3.4 1.2 *** 1.4 *** -0.7 *** -0.2 2.1
Bench. -14.7 -1.8 1.7 -12.9 -3.4 2.3 * 1.7 * 0.3 * 0.6 1.4
Dev. 18.4 5.2 -1.6 13.1 6.9 -1.1 -0.3 -1.0 -0.8 0.7
Sample 1.2 ** 2.1 * 2.5 * -0.9 -0.4 0.1 -4.4 -2.7 4.4 -1.6
Bench. -33.7 -14.0 * 13.2 * -19.7 -27.2 2.1 ** 2.2 ** 1.7 ** -0.1 0.5
Dev. 34.9 16.1 -10.8 18.8 26.9 -2.0 -6.5 -4.4 4.5 -2.1
Sample 4.4 4.0 4.2 0.4 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.1 -0.1
Bench. 5.2 ** 4.3 ** 4.3 ** 0.9 -0.1 0.4 ** 0.4 ** 0.5 ** 0.0 -0.1
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For the EBIT Interest Coverage Ratio, in the year preceding the offer I observe large deviations 
from benchmark for most of the industries, being some negative, which supports my hypothesis, 
and two other industry showing very positive deviations (i.e. Technology and 
Telecommunications). Similar conclusions can be drawn from how issuers’ EBIT Interest 
Coverage Ratios evolved in the three years preceding the offer, mostly if we compare with industry 
evolutions.  
As for the Debt Service Interest Coverage Ratios, despite the still very large relative standard errors 
in my sample of issuers, I find more consistent data, with all issuers’ ratios below its industry peers’ 
average in the year preceding the offer. As for the evolution of these ratios in the three years 
preceding the offer, apart from the Telecommunications industry, most of other industries show 
negative evolutions compared to its industry averages.  
These results support the hypothesis that firms issuing mandatory convertible securities to raise 
external funds have lower levels of solvency as these type of securities place fewer financial 
constraints on the issuers that has already high financial distress costs.  
It should also be mentioned that these results raise a potential industry interference that is not being 
covered in this study. 
Financial Stability 
Lee and Figlewicz (2000) argue that firms issuing mandatory convertible securities have greater 
levels of indebtedness. 
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Table 9 – Financial Stability 
Values for sample firms, its industry peers, and deviations of the former to the latter using data relative to the end of the three fiscal years preceding 
the issuance of equity-like mandatory convertible securities by the sample firms. Debt to Equity refers to Debt to Equity Ratio, Debt to Assets refers 
to Debt to Assets Ratio and Debt to Enterprise Value refers to Debt to Enterprise Value Ratio. Input values to these ratios are provided by Thomson 
Reuters EIKON and Compustat. Changes in the variables over the period under analysis are presented in absolute values. Relative standard errors 
are calculated as standard error of mean divided by mean and expressed as percentage. 
 
*** Indicates a relative standard error inferior to 10%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 10% and 50%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 50% and 100%. 
Results show large overall relative standard errors in the sample of issuers, mostly for Debt to 
Equity and Debt to Assets ratios. 
Although results in Table 9 are not conclusive for most of the industries, for the heavy-assets’ 
industries, I find support in the Debt to Equity Ratio. There is a general worsening of Debt to Equity 
Ratios in the three years preceding the offer, even after adjusted for industry benchmark. 
The remaining ratios show deviations from industry peers close to zero and therefore, do not 
support my hypothesis. 
In summary, data shows that firms issuing mandatory convertible securities, although are in line 
with industry peers in debt to assets and debt to enterprise value ratios, have generally greater debt 
to equity ratios, mostly for heavy-assets’ industries.  
5.3 Static Trade Off Theory 
Complementarily to the financial distress costs hypothesis, I now summary broader conclusions by 
analyzing Depreciations, Effective Corporate Tax Rates, Altman’s Z-Scores, EBIT Interest 
Coverage and Debt to Equity Ratios. 
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2
Sample 7.6 *** 4.1 * 1.8 3.5 2.3 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.2 *** 1.3 ** 1.0 ** -0.1 0.3
Bench. 0.8 * 0.9 ** 0.7 ** 0.0 0.1 0.3 ** 0.3 ** 0.3 ** 0.0 0.0 0.4 ** 0.4 ** 0.3 ** 0.0 0.0
Dev. 6.8 3.2 1.1 3.5 2.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.7 -0.1 0.2
Sample 0.9 ** 0.6 ** 0.6 *** 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 *** 0.3 *** 0.2 *** 0.0 0.0
Bench. 0.6 ** 0.5 * 0.5 ** 0.1 0.0 0.3 ** 0.2 ** 0.2 ** 0.0 0.0 0.2 ** 0.2 ** 0.2 ** 0.0 0.0
Dev. 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sample 3.6 3.5 3.1 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 ** 0.6 ** 0.6 ** 0.0 0.0
Bench. 3.8 * 3.8 * 3.9 ** 0.0 -0.1 0.6 ** 0.6 ** 0.6 ** 0.0 0.0 0.3 ** 0.3 ** 0.3 ** 0.0 0.0
Dev. -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 0.1 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
Sample 13.2 6.1 4.9 7.0 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 ** 0.8 0.9 -0.4 -0.1
Bench. 0.4 ** 0.4 * 0.5 ** 0.0 -0.1 0.2 ** 0.2 ** 0.2 ** 0.0 0.0 0.2 ** 0.2 ** 0.4 ** 0.0 -0.1
Dev. 12.8 5.7 4.4 7.1 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 -0.4 0.0
Sample 1.2 *** 2.7 ** 2.5 -1.4 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 *** 0.4 *** 0.4 -0.1 -0.1
Bench. 0.6 ** 0.6 ** 0.8 * 0.1 -0.2 0.3 ** 0.2 ** 0.3 ** 0.0 0.0 0.2 ** 0.2 ** 0.1 ** 0.0 0.0
Dev. 0.6 2.1 1.7 -1.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Sample -0.9 *** -0.7 *** -0.7 *** -0.2 0.0 0.3 *** 0.3 *** 0.4 *** 0.0 -0.1 0.7 *** 0.4 *** 1.2 *** 0.2 -0.8
Bench. 0.6 ** 0.6 ** 0.9 ** 0.0 -0.3 0.2 * 0.2 * 0.3 * 0.0 0.0 0.1 ** 0.1 ** 0.2 ** 0.0 0.0
Dev. -1.5 -1.3 -1.6 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.3 -0.7
Sample 1.8 * 2.4 ** 1.9 ** -0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 *** 0.7 *** 0.8 *** -0.2 0.0
Bench. 0.9 * 0.8 * 0.8 * 0.1 0.0 0.3 ** 0.3 ** 0.3 ** 0.0 0.0 0.2 ** 0.3 ** 0.3 ** 0.0 0.0
Dev. 1.0 1.6 1.2 -0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 -0.2 0.0
Sample 1.4 ** 1.4 ** 1.4 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 *** 0.4 *** 0.5 ** 0.0 0.0
Bench. 1.3 ** 1.3 ** 1.3 ** 0.0 0.0 0.4 ** 0.4 ** 0.3 ** 0.0 0.0 0.4 ** 0.4 ** 0.4 ** 0.0 0.0
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Data presented in the tables including these variables show evidence that firms issuing mandatory 
convertibles have higher levels of depreciations and lower effective corporate tax rates as compared 
with its industry peers. This suggest a “tax exhaustion state” and less ability to benefit from tax 
advantages of additional debt.  
These firms also have higher bankruptcy risk, since data shows Z-Scores consistently below 1.8 
and, most of times, below its industry benchmark. Moreover, there is a consistent worsening of this 
score as firms approach the offering date, which brings consistency to the theory that equity-like 
mandatory convertibles are a capital source of last resort by suggesting these securities as a 
consequence of the deterioration of issuers’ credit profile, and the resulting shrinkage of financing 
alternatives. 
Closely related with issuers’ bankruptcy risk is their ability to satisfy their debt service. For the 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio data shows high deviations from industry benchmark, for most of the 
industries, and high levels of deterioration, mostly in the year preceding the offer.  
As for the financial stability, data is not so conclusive, showing mixed results for the most asset-
light industries. For the heavy-assets industries, data is nonetheless more conclusive, showing 
higher debt to equity ratios which suggests once again that these firms are generally in a limit 
situation, where more debt would heavily aggravate their risk of bankruptcy.  
In the light of these results, I am confident to confirm that data sustains MacKIE‐MASON (1990) 
findings, specifically that firms prefer to raise capital using securities that bears the lowest 
probability of default whenever present value of financial distress costs exceeds the present value 
of expected tax benefits created by the issue. 
Table 10 – Correlation of Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
Correlations between Buy-and Hold Abnormal Returns and Zscore, EBIT Int. Cov. Ratio and Debt to Equity. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns are 
computed in the 52 weeks after the issuance of mandatory convertible securities by sample firms and adjusted for industry average returns. The 
remaining variables are computed for the two years preceding the offer. Data was provided by Datastream and Thomson Reuters EIKON. 
Correlations are calculated over arithmetic averages and blank values are not considered as an occurrence.  
 
Finally, Table 10 suggests abnormal returns are slightly higher for greater Z-Scores in the year 
preceding the offer, which is contrary to my hypothesis. Nevertheless, data supports my hypothesis 
if we consider Z-Scores two years before the offer.  
Year t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 0.15 -0.10 -0.22 -0.34 0.17 0.35
Zscore EBIT Int. Cov. Ratio Debt to Equity
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As for the remaining variables analyzed, data shows higher buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the 
52 weeks following the offer, for issuers with lower levels of EBIT Interest Coverage Ratios and 
higher Debt to Equity Ratios in the two years preceding the issuance, which although in line with 
Huckins (1999) hypothesis, is contrary to the results he obtained in his study.  
5.4 Optimal Capital Structure Hypothesis 
Research shows that managers tend to make decisions based on industry target benchmarks. 
Specifically, the optimal capital structure theory suggests that managers tend to pursue target 
indebtedness ratios comparing their firms with its industry peers.  
Table 11 – Optimal Capital Structure 
Values for sample firms, its industry peers, and deviations of the former to the latter using data relative to the end of the three fiscal years preceding 
the issuance of equity-like mandatory convertible securities by the sample firms. Debt to Equity refers to Debt to Equity Ratio. Input values to these 
ratios are provided by Thomson Reuters EIKON and Compustat. Changes in the variables over the period under analysis are presented in absolute 
values. Relative standard errors are calculated as standard error of mean divided by mean and expressed as percentage. 
 
*** Indicates a relative standard error inferior to 10%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 10% and 50%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 50% and 100%. 
Consistent with Billingsley et al. (1994) results, I find some evidence of improvements in Debt to 
Equity Ratios for the year following the offer of mandatory convertibles and significant deviations 
from industry targets in the three years preceding the offer, mostly in the year immediately before 
the offer.  
Nevertheless, and in line with Billingsley et al. (1994) results, conclusions about the decrease of 
this mismatch are mixed for some industries and do not support my hypothesis.  
t t-1 t-2 t-3 t t-1 t-2
Sample 3.7 * 7.6 *** 4.1 * 1.8 -3.9 3.5 2.3
Bench. 0.8 ** 0.8 * 0.9 ** 0.7 ** 0.0 0.0 0.1
Dev. 2.9 6.8 3.2 1.1 -3.9 3.5 2.1
Sample 0.9 ** 0.9 ** 0.6 ** 0.6 *** 0.1 0.2 0.1
Bench. 0.8 * 0.6 ** 0.5 * 0.5 ** 0.2 0.1 0.0
Dev. 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.0
Sample 2.5 3.6 3.5 3.1 -1.1 0.0 0.4
Bench. 3.4 * 3.8 * 3.8 * 3.9 ** -0.4 0.0 -0.1
Dev. -0.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 0.1 0.5
Sample 4.3 13.2 6.1 4.9 -8.9 7.0 1.3
Bench. 0.4 ** 0.4 ** 0.4 * 0.5 ** 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Dev. 3.9 12.8 5.7 4.4 -8.9 7.1 1.3
Sample 1.2 *** 1.2 *** 2.7 ** 2.5 0.0 -1.4 0.2
Bench. 0.8 ** 0.6 ** 0.6 ** 0.8 * 0.2 0.1 -0.2
Dev. 0.4 0.6 2.1 1.7 -0.2 -1.5 0.4
Sample -0.3 *** -0.9 *** -0.7 *** -0.7 *** 0.6 -0.2 0.0
Bench. 0.6 ** 0.6 ** 0.6 ** 0.9 ** 0.1 0.0 -0.3
Dev. -0.9 -1.5 -1.3 -1.6 0.6 -0.1 0.3
Sample 1.9 * 1.8 * 2.4 ** 1.9 ** 0.1 -0.6 0.4
Bench. 1.0 ** 0.9 * 0.8 * 0.8 * 0.1 0.1 0.0
Dev. 0.9 1.0 1.6 1.2 0.0 -0.6 0.4
Sample 1.5 ** 1.4 ** 1.4 ** 1.4 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Bench. 1.3 ** 1.3 ** 1.3 ** 1.3 ** 0.0 0.0 0.0
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One explanation, besides the already mentioned large relative standard errors in the sample of 
issuers, could be that issuing firms have more pressing issues to address, such as financial distress 
or bad credit profiles, which are more urgent and has higher priority for deciding about what 
instruments to use when raising capital. More importantly, these factors are likely more limitative 
to what concerns their alternatives of external capital sources. 
5.5 Staged-Investment Hypothesis 
The staged-investment hypothesis suggests that equity-like mandatory convertibles can help firms 
with sequential financing needs to lower their financing costs by matching its maturities with the 
time of the new round of financing. 
Table 12 – Capital Expenditures 
Deviations of the issuing firms to it industry peers using data relative to the end of the fiscal year preceding the issuance of equity-like mandatory 
convertible securities by the sample firms. Capex to Revenues refers to Capital Expenditures standardized by Revenues, then multiplied by 100. 
Input values to this metric are provided by Thomson Reuters EIKON. Capex to Revenues values are presented in percentage and changes from the 
previous year are presented in percentage points. Relative standard errors are calculated as standard error of mean divided by mean and expressed 
as percentage. 
 
*** Indicates a relative standard error inferior to 10%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 10% and 50%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 50% and 100%. 
Deviations of Capital Expenditures from benchmark, in the year preceding the offer, present large 
relative standard errors, what could justify the mixed results. 
In fact, data strongly supports this hypothesis for Energy and Retail Trade industries but is 
inconclusive for the remaining industries, presenting levels close to zero.  
As for the changes of these deviations over the two years preceding the offer, they suggest small 
increases of Capital Expenditures for most of the firms with Capital Expenditures below 
benchmark.  
One possible explanation is that issuing firms have in fact investment opportunities (as results for 
its industry suggest) but limited financial cushion, which leads them to have lower investments.  
Industry N CAPEX to Revenues (%) Change (p.p.)
t-1 t-1
Construction 3 -0.12 0.46
Energy 5 26.73 14.02
Healthcare 3 0.08 -1.33
Manufacturing 3 -1.41 0.15
Retail Trade 4 13.21 -8.75
Technology 1 -0.64 0.42
Telecommunications 2 6.76 0.80
Utilities 10 -0.17 1.50
Equity-Like Mandatory Convertibles: A Capital Raising Alternative 
37 
5.6 Cash-Flow Shortage Theory 
The cash-flow shortage theory suggests that debt levels and firm values are positively correlated 
because of the signaling effect to the market of regular debt commitments.  
Table 13 – Operating Cash Flows 
Values for sample firms, its industry peers, and deviations of the former to the latter using data relative to the end of the fiscal year following and 
the three fiscal years preceding the issuance of equity-like mandatory convertible securities by the sample firms. Operating Cash Flows are computed 
as EBIT plus Depreciations minus Taxes, then multiplied by 100 and standardized by Revenues. Input values to this variable are provided by 
Compustat and Thomson Reuters EIKON. Relative standard errors are calculated as standard error of mean divided by mean and expressed as 
percentage. 
 
*** Indicates a relative standard error inferior to 10%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 10% and 50%. 
*** Indicates a relative standard error between 50% and 100%. 
To suit the cash-flow shortage theory to our equity-like mandatories analysis, I correlate the offered 
dividend yields with the abnormal results of a 52 week buy-and-hold investment in my sample 
firms’ common stock.  
For this test, data shows a non-statistically significant correlation of -0.04 therefore not supporting 
my hypothesis of a positive correlation. 
In an attempt to disprove Miller and Rock (1985) I analyzed also the evolution of operating cash 
flows for issuing firms and how they compare to its industry peers.  
Table 13 shows data with large relative standard errors, especially for the sample of issuers, which 
could justify the mixed results, both for the deviations from the benchmark and the trends of these 
deviations.  
t t-1 t-2 t-3 t t-1 t-2
Sample -8.3 *** -19.9 -25.6 -16.1 11.6 5.7 -9.5
Bench. 5.0 ** 2.4 ** 0.0 ** -0.1 ** 2.6 2.4 0.0
Dev. -13.3 -22.3 -25.6 -16.0 9.0 3.3 -9.5
Sample 43.7 43.6 45.6 40.5 0.1 -2.0 5.1
Bench. 34.2 ** 29.1 ** 33.0 ** 32.8 ** 5.1 -3.9 0.2
Dev. 9.5 14.5 12.6 7.7 -5.0 1.9 4.9
Sample 12.0 9.4 9.5 8.8 2.6 -0.1 0.8
Bench. 7.8 ** 8.7 * 13.5 * 12.6 * -0.9 -4.8 0.9
Dev. 4.2 0.7 -3.9 -3.8 3.5 4.6 -0.1
Sample 8.5 8.1 1.4 4.2 0.4 6.7 -2.8
Bench. 13.0 ** 13.3 ** 11.9 ** 10.4 ** -0.3 1.4 1.5
Dev. -4.5 -5.2 -10.5 -6.2 0.7 5.3 -4.3
Sample 35.2 34.6 38.3 39.0 0.6 -3.7 -0.7
Bench. 6.1 ** 7.7 ** 7.8 ** 1.4 ** -1.6 -0.1 6.4
Dev. 29.0 26.9 30.5 37.6 2.1 -3.6 -7.1
Sample 10.2 *** 12.6 *** -2.6 *** 5.5 *** -2.4 15.2 -8.1
Bench. 14.4 * 12.6 * 13.6 * 2.0 * 1.8 -1.1 11.6
Dev. -4.2 0.1 -16.2 3.4 -4.2 16.3 -19.6
Sample 20.7 22.9 26.7 26.8 -2.1 -3.8 -0.1
Bench. 25.9 ** 24.0 ** 26.1 ** 25.3 ** 1.9 -2.1 0.9
Dev. -5.2 -1.1 0.6 1.5 -4.0 -1.7 -0.9
Sample 26.0 26.2 27.3 26.3 -0.2 -1.1 1.0
Bench. 24.9 ** 24.6 ** 23.8 ** 23.1 ** 0.3 0.8 0.7
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Nevertheless, conclusions are more consistent for absolute values, as more than half of the 
industries show a slight deterioration of issuers’ operating cash flows in the two years before the 
offer takes place, and a slight improvement of the same variable afterwards.  
Again, data suggests industry biasness as results, despite strong, are not consistent across industries 
and therefore no conclusions can be drawn. 
5.7 Pecking Order Theory 
In a world with information asymmetry, new equity issues are commonly seen as a “lemon” and 
discounted accordingly.  
Being that equity-like mandatory convertibles are safer than straight equity, they should help to 
mitigate this information asymmetry effect. Therefore, when issuers are underpriced before the 
offer, market response to the issue should be more positive.  
By regressing the 52 week buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the year following the offer and the 
three years preceding the offer I find that results do not support this hypothesis for the year 
preceding the offer (correlation of +0.36) and, despite supportive for my hypothesis, they are close 
to zero for the two years preceding the offer (correlations of -0.08 and -0.18, respectively). 
One possible explanation is that the market is not efficient acknowledging these securities, as they 
are complex to price, and therefore discounts them as straight equity. Another possible explanation 
is the existence of some degree of biasness introduced from the fact that some of my sample firms 
are issuers of multiple offers during the period of analysis. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
My findings concerning the characteristics of firms issuing equity-like mandatory convertible 
securities are consistent with tax benefits, financial distress and static trade-off hypotheses. 
Firms issuing mandatory convertibles, have greater non-debt tax shields and lower corporate tax 
rates, which supports Auerbach and Poterba (1987) findings that these firms are in a tax exhaustion 
state and is consistent with tax benefits hypothesis.  
Mandatory convertible issuers also display higher default probabilities, lower levels of financial 
slack, liquidity, solvency and financial stability. More importantly, firms display a significant 
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deterioration of these metrics as closer they get to the offering date. These findings support the 
choice for a safer alternative to raise capital whenever firms are financially troubled, highly levered 
and/or generally incapable of complying with future fixed debt commitments that could jeopardize 
its solvency status. Also, its financial deterioration suggests an exhaustion of other capital raising 
alternatives at reasonable refinancing terms.  
There is also some evidence that managers base their choices of instruments to raise capital on 
industry target benchmarks (e.g. indebtedness levels) and that equity-like mandatory convertible 
securities help firms with sequential financing needs to lower their financing costs by matching 
maturity dates with the time when the firm needs a new round of financing. Nevertheless, although 
the results for these hypotheses are consistent for some industries, conclusions consistent across all 
industries, suggesting industry interference for these hypotheses, which is not being analyzed in 
this work. 
For future studies on this topic, there are still plenty of research opportunities in mandatory 
convertible securities, mostly in the future when they become more abundant and popular, since 
sample size has been a constant issue in this and similar previous studies.  
In terms of issuers’ characteristics, one important question to answer would be the role of the 
issuer’s specific industry on the decision criteria of instruments to raise capital. Moreover, it would 
also be interesting to further explore the trade-offs of the choice for the mandatory convertible’s 
three main features (conversion ratio, cap on capital appreciation and dividend yield). Finally, one 
open question that would probably be extremely hard to answer, given the available historical data, 
is: how these securities actually help its issuers solving their constraints in the long-run. 
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26/06/14 AmSurg Corp United States Healthcare Healthcare Pvd ambulatory surgery svcs 62 Health Care and Social Assistance8011 Offices and clinics of doctors of medicine
04/06/15 Anadarko Petroleum Corp United States Natural Resource Energy Oil,gas exploration,prodn co 21 Mining 1311 Crude petroleum and natural gas
06/01/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States Construction Construction Design, build homes 23 Construction 1531 Operative builders
04/05/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States Construction Construction Design, build homes 23 Construction 1531 Operative builders
10/07/12 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States Construction Construction Construct residential bldgs 23 Construction 1531 Operative builders
14/09/06 Bristow Group Inc United States Transportation Retail Trade Pvd helicopter transp services 48 Retail Trade 4522 Air transportation, nonscheduled
27/06/06 Chesapeake Energy Corp United States Natural Resource Energy Oil,gas exploration,prodn co 21 Mining 1311 Crude petroleum and natural gas
14/02/13 Cliffs Natural Resources Inc United States Natural Resource Energy Iron ore,coal mining company 21 Mining 1011 Iron ores
25/06/14 Dominion Resources Inc United States Electric Service Utilities Electric,gas utility company 22 Utilities 4911 Electric services
07/10/14 Dynegy Inc United States Electric Service Utilities Electric utility company 22 Utilities 4911 Electric services
10/06/14 Exelon Corp United States Electric Service Utilities Electric,gas utility company 22 Utilities 4931 Electric and other services combined
04/06/15 Frontier Communications Corp United States Telephone Commun Telecommunication Wired Telecommunications Carriers 51 Information 4813 Telephone communications, except radiotelephone
28/03/11 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co United States Manufacturing Manufacturing Mnfr,whl tires,rubbers,resins 32 Manufacturing 3011 Tires and inner tubes
10/02/05 Huntsman Corp United States Manufacturing Manufacturing Mnfr,whl polymers,chemicals 32 Manufacturing 2816 Inorganic pigments
26/10/15 Kinder Morgan Inc United States Oil/Gas Pipeline Retail Trade Pvd gas transmission services 22 Utilities 4922 Natural gas transmission
19/11/14 Kindred Healthcare Inc United States Healthcare Healthcare Provide healthcare services 62 Health Care and Social Assistance8051 Sk lled nursing care facilities
14/09/10 NextEra Energy Inc United States Electric Service Utilities Provide electric services 22 Utilities 4911 Electric services
01/05/12 NextEra Energy Inc United States Electric Service Utilities Provide electric services 22 Utilities 4911 Electric services
11/09/15 NextEra Energy Inc United States Electric Service Utilities Provide electric services 22 Utilities 4911 Electric services
26/01/06 NRG Energy Inc United States Electric Service Utilities Electric,gas utility company 22 Utilities 4911 Electric services
23/03/05 PNM Resources Inc United States Electric Service Utilities Own,operates gas,elec co 22 Utilities 4911 Electric services
11/04/11 PPL Corp United States Electric Service Utilities Electric utility company 22 Utilities 4911 Electric services
26/01/05 Rite Aid Corp United States Retail Retail Trade Own,operate drug stores 44 Retail Trade 5912 Drug stores and proprietary stores
16/08/05 Rite Aid Corp United States Retail Retail Trade Own,operate drug stores 44 Retail Trade 5912 Drug stores and proprietary stores
14/01/15 Southwestern Energy Co United States Natural Resource Energy Oil, gas expln,prodn co 21 Mining 1311 Crude petroleum and natural gas
10/09/15 Stericycle Inc United States Sanitation Utilities Pvd waste disposal mgmt svcs 56 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation4953 Refuse systems
22/09/09 Tenet Healthcare Corp United States Healthcare Healthcare Own,operate hospitals 62 Health Care and Social Assistance8062 General medical and surgical hospitals
09/12/14 T-Mobile US Inc United States Radio/TV/Telecom Telecommunication Wireless Telecommunications Carriers 51 Information 4812 Radiotelephone communications
30/07/14 Tyson Foods Inc United States Manufacturing Manufacturing Produce,whl poultry,meat prod 31 Manufacturing 2015 Poultry slaughtering and processing
22/02/11 Unisys Corp United States Manufacturing Technology Mnfr electronic info systems 54 Manufacturing 3571 Electronic computers
16/07/15 WPX Energy Inc United States Natural Resource Energy Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 21 Mining 1311 Crude petroleum and natural gas
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26/06/14 AmSurg Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
5.250% Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock, 
Series A-1
26/06/14 01/07/17 5.250% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Future Acquisitions
04/06/15 Anadarko Petroleum Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 8,000,000 7.50% Tangible Equity Units 04/06/15 07/06/18 7.500% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
06/01/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
7 1/2% Mandatory Convertible Subordinated Notes 
due 2013
06/01/10 15/01/13 7.500% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
04/05/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 3,000,000 7.25% Tangible Equity Units 04/05/10 15/08/13 7.250% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
10/07/12 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 7.50% Tangible Equity Units 10/07/12 15/07/15 7.500% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
14/09/06 Bristow Group Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 5.50% Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock 14/09/06 17/09/09 5.500% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
27/06/06 Chesapeake Energy Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 6.25% Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock 27/06/06 15/06/09 6.250% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
14/02/13 Cliffs Natural Resources Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
27,000,000 Depositary Shares Each Representing a 
1/40th Interest in a Share of 7.00% Series A 
Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock, Class A
14/02/13 01/02/16 7.000% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
25/06/14 Dominion Resources Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 18,000,000 2014 Series A Equity Units 25/06/14 01/07/17 4.875% + 1.5% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
07/10/14 Dynegy Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
5.375% SERIES A MANDATORY CONVERTIBLE 
PREFERRED STOCK
07/10/14 01/11/17 5.375% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
10/06/14 Exelon Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 20,000,000 Equity Units (purchase contract + note) 11/06/14 01/06/17 4% + 2.5% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
04/06/15 Frontier Communications Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
17,500,000 shares of 11.125% Mandatory 
Convertible Preferred Stock, Series A
04/06/15 29/06/18 11.125% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Acquisition Fin.
28/03/11 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 5.875% Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock 28/03/11 01/05/14 5.875% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Redeem Class of Shs
10/02/05 Huntsman Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes  5% Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock 10/02/05 16/02/08 5.000% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
26/10/15 Kinder Morgan Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
32,000,000 Depositary Shares Representing a 
1/20th Interest in a Share of 9.75% Series A 
Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock
26/10/15 26/10/18 9.750% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Paymnt on Borrowings
19/11/14 Kindred Healthcare Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 150,000 7.50% Tangible Equity Units 19/11/14 01/12/17 7.500% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Reduce Indebtedness
14/09/10 NextEra Energy Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
7,000,000 Equity Units (Initially Consisting of 
7,000,000 Corporate Units)
14/09/10 01/09/13 1.9% + 5.10% Yes No Yes No No Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
01/05/12 NextEra Energy Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
12,000,000 Equity Units (Initially Consisting of 
12,000,000 Corporate Units)
01/05/12 01/06/15 1.7% + 3.899% Yes No Yes No No Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
11/09/15 NextEra Energy Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
14,000,000 Equity Units (Initially Consisting of 
14,000,000 Corporate Units)
11/09/15 01/09/18 2.36% + 4.011% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Investment / Loan
26/01/06 NRG Energy Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 5.75% Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock 26/01/06 16/03/09 5.750% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Acquisition Fin.
23/03/05 PNM Resources Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
4,300,000 Equity Units (Initially Consisting of 
4,300,000 Corporate Units 6.75% Equity Units
23/03/05 16/05/08 1.95% + 4.8% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
11/04/11 PPL Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
17,000,000 Equity Units (Initially Consisting of 
17,000,000 Corporate Units)
11/04/11 01/05/14 4.32% + 4.43% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Reduce Indebtedness
26/01/05 Rite Aid Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
7.0% Series E Mandatory Convertible Preferred 
Stock
25/01/05 01/02/08 7.000% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
16/08/05 Rite Aid Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
5.50% Series I Mandatory Convertible Preferred 
Stock
16/08/05 17/11/08 5.500% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
14/01/15 Southwestern Energy Co United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
30,000,000 Depositary Shares Representing a 
1/20th Interest in a Share of 6.25% Series B 
Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock
14/01/15 15/01/18 6.250% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Paymnt on Borrowings
10/09/15 Stericycle Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
7,000,000 Depositary Shares Representing a 1/10th 
Interest in a Share of 5.25% Series A Mandatory 
Convertible Preferred Stock
09/09/15 15/09/18 5.250% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Acquisition Fin.
22/09/09 Tenet Healthcare Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 7.00% Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock 22/09/09 01/10/12 7.000% Yes No Yes No Yes Ordinary Shares General Corp. Purp.
09/12/14 T-Mobile US Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
5.50% Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock, 
Series A
09/12/14 15/12/17 5.500% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
30/07/14 Tyson Foods Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes 30,000,000 Units 4.75% TANGIBLE EQUITY UNITS 30/07/14 15/07/17 4.750% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Acquisition Fin.
22/02/11 Unisys Corp United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
6.25% Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock, 
Series A
22/02/11 01/03/14 6.250% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock General Corp. Purp.
16/07/15 WPX Energy Inc United States CVT Convertible Yes Yes
6.25% Series A Mandatory Convertible Preferred 
Stock
16/07/15 31/07/18 6.250% Yes No Yes No Yes Common Stock Acquisition Fin.
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26/06/14 AmSurg Corp United States N US 150 100 5.3% 22.5 55.1 1.8 2.2 1.8 1.8 3 26/06/14 26/06/14 01/07/17 3.0 U.S. Public NONE 31/12/15 31/03/14
04/06/15 Anadarko Petroleum Corp United States Y US 400 100 7.5% 20.0 69.8 14.3 14.3 3 3 04/06/15 04/06/15 07/06/18 3.0 U.S. Public NONE 31/12/15 31/03/15
06/01/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States N US 50 100 7.5% 22.0 5.6 178.3 5.4 4.5 178.3 3 3 06/01/10 06/01/10 15/01/13 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 30/09/15 30/09/09
04/05/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States N US 75 100 7.3% 20.0 6.9 145.3 145.4 3.3 3.3 04/05/10 04/05/10 15/08/13 3.3 U.S. Public NYSE 30/09/15 30/09/09
10/07/12 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States N US 100 100 7.5% 22.0 3.5 283.3 8.6 7.0 283.3 3 10/07/12 10/07/12 15/07/15 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 30/09/15 30/09/11
14/09/06 Bristow Group Inc United States N US 200 50 5.5% 1.4 1.2 na 3 14/09/06 14/09/06 17/09/09 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/03/16 30/06/06
27/06/06 Chesapeake Energy Corp United States N US 500 250 6.3% 8.6 7.2 na 3 27/06/06 27/06/06 15/06/09 3.0 U.S. Public NONE 31/12/15 31/03/06
14/02/13 Cliffs Natural Resources Inc United States N US 675 25 7.0% 34.5 28.1 na 3 14/02/13 14/02/13 01/02/16 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 30/09/12
25/06/14 Dominion Resources Inc United States Y US 900 100 6.4% 22.5 87.2 11.5 0.7 0.6 11.5 1 3 25/06/14 25/06/14 01/07/17 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 31/03/14
07/10/14 Dynegy Inc United States Y US 400 100 5.4% 23.9 38.8 2.6 07/10/14 07/10/14 01/11/17 3.1 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 30/09/14
10/06/14 Exelon Corp United States Y US 1,150 100 6.5% 25.0 43.8 1.1 1.4 1.1 22.9 1 3 11/06/14 10/06/14 01/06/17 3.0 U.S. Public NONE 31/12/15 31/03/14
04/06/15 Frontier Communications Corp United States N US 1,750 100 11.1% 17.5 5.9 17.0 17.0 3 04/06/15 04/06/15 29/06/18 3.1 U.S. Public NASDQ 31/12/15 31/03/15
28/03/11 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co United States N US 435 50 5.9% 25.0 18.2 3.4 2.7 2.8 3 3 28/03/11 28/03/11 01/05/14 3.1 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 31/12/10
10/02/05 Huntsman Corp United States N US 250 50 5.0% 23.0 28.3 1.8 2.2 1.8 1.8 10/02/05 10/02/05 16/02/08 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 31/12/04
26/10/15 Kinder Morgan Inc United States N US 1,568 49 9.8% 17.5 32.4 1.8 30.9 26/10/15 26/10/15 26/10/18 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 30/09/15
19/11/14 Kindred Healthcare Inc United States Y US 150 100 7.5% 17.5 23.2 50.6 43.1 1 3 19/11/14 19/11/14 01/12/17 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 30/09/14
14/09/10 NextEra Energy Inc United States N US 345 100 7.0% 25.0 68.8 14.5 0.9 0.7 14.5 3 3 14/09/10 14/09/10 01/09/13 3.0 U.S. Public NONE 31/12/15 30/06/10
01/05/12 NextEra Energy Inc United States N US 600 95 5.6% 20.0 77.2 0.6 12.3 3 01/05/12 01/05/12 01/06/15 3.1 U.S. Public NONE 31/12/15 31/12/11
11/09/15 NextEra Energy Inc United States Y US 700 100 6.4% 20.0 114.4 8.7 8.7 1 3 11/09/15 11/09/15 01/09/18 3.0 U.S. Public NONE 31/12/15 30/06/15
26/01/06 NRG Energy Inc United States N US 500 250 5.8% 24.0 60.5 5.1 4.1 4.1 26/01/06 26/01/06 16/03/09 3.1 U.S. Public NONE 31/12/15 31/12/05
23/03/05 PNM Resources Inc United States N US 215 50 6.8% 22.0 32.7 1.5 23/03/05 23/03/05 16/05/08 3.1 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 31/12/04
11/04/11 PPL Corp United States N US 850 100 8.8% 22.5 31.0 32.3 2.0 1.6 32.3 3 11/04/11 11/04/11 01/05/14 3.1 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 31/12/10
26/01/05 Rite Aid Corp United States N US 113 49 7.0% 50.0 5.4 14.0 9.3 9.2 3 25/01/05 26/01/05 01/02/08 3.0 U.S. Public NONE 27/02/16 27/11/04
16/08/05 Rite Aid Corp United States N US 115 25 5.5% 20.0 5.3 4.7 4.7 3.3 3.3 16/08/05 16/08/05 17/11/08 3.3 U.S. Public NONE 27/02/16 28/05/05
14/01/15 Southwestern Energy Co United States N US 1,500 50 6.3% 17.5 27.0 37.0 43.5 1.9 14/01/15 14/01/15 15/01/18 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 30/09/14
10/09/15 Stericycle Inc United States N US 700 100 5.3% 25.0 136.3 7.3 09/09/15 10/09/15 15/09/18 3.0 U.S. Public NASDQ 31/12/15 30/06/15
22/09/09 Tenet Healthcare Corp United States N US 300 1000 7.0% 20.0 7.0 142.5 170.9 142.5 142.5 3 3 22/09/09 22/09/09 01/10/12 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 30/06/09
09/12/14 T-Mobile US Inc United States Y US 870 50 5.5% 20.0 31.2 1.9 1.6 1.6 1 09/12/14 09/12/14 15/12/17 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 30/09/14
30/07/14 Tyson Foods Inc United States Y US 1,500 100 4.8% 25.0 47.3 21.2 1.3 1.1 21.2 0.7 3 30/07/14 30/07/14 15/07/17 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 03/10/15 28/06/14
22/02/11 Unisys Corp United States N US 225 100 6.3% 22.0 45.7 2.2 2.7 2.2 2.2 3 3 22/02/11 22/02/11 01/03/14 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 31/12/10
16/07/15 WPX Energy Inc United States N US 350 50 6.3% 20.0 12.1 4.1 3 16/07/15 16/07/15 31/07/18 3.0 U.S. Public NYSE 31/12/15 30/06/15
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26/06/14 AmSurg Corp United States -11.2 -13.3 -22.5 -14.8 -21.4 14,111 10,921 8,403 24.07 39.17 120.2 760.4 59.75 782.4 2126.8 175.8 49.7 0.00 23.70 1.40
04/06/15 Anadarko Petroleum Corp United States -3.3 -3 12.7 -10.4 23.4 51,849 44,451 64,470 32.16 25.22 1401 -1652 59.44 16332 12819 3560 509 1.20 -5.20 1.00
06/01/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States -10.1 -13.9 4.7 -29.6 -12.8 5,589 5,158 7,533 4.94 19.13 290.5 41.6 10.23 196.6 630.4 1355 382.3 0.00 0.70 5.40
04/05/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States -10.1 -13.9 4.7 -29.6 -12.8 5,589 5,158 7,533 4.94 19.13 290.5 41.6 10.23 196.6 630.4 1355 382.3 0.00 0.70 5.40
10/07/12 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States -10.1 -13.9 4.7 -29.6 -12.8 5,589 5,158 7,533 2.62 19.13 290.5 41.6 10.23 198.4 630.4 1355 382.3 0.00 0.70 5.40
14/09/06 Bristow Group Inc United States -12 -27.5 -5.9 -71.1 -61.2 9,168 9,601 9,020 24.62 104.3 118.6 10.01 575.7 1499.2 1309.4 302.2 7.20 -3.80 1.50
27/06/06 Chesapeake Energy Corp United States -13.3 -7.7 6.8 -24.8 19.1 637,526 525,890 397,091 15.21 -1.39 1191 2268 5.51 5812.2 -924 3165 663 0.00 -0.30 0.70
14/02/13 Cliffs Natural Resources Inc United States -9.7 -7.2 -31.4 97.5 244.9 138,887 99,879 88,189 44.47 -17.66 293 1.1 5.52 6336.8 -2712.7 1639.2 442 0.00 52.90 1.70
25/06/14 Dominion Resources Inc United States 0.9 -1.1 -5.8 4.2 10.1 20,952 21,000 26,710 20.1 21.25 1117 4380 75.2 11699 12664 3304 583 3.50 24.40 0.50
07/10/14 Dynegy Inc United States -13.3 -12.8 -28.6 -44.8 -20 40,266 33,906 33,188 20.42 21.57 644 125 10.65 2050 2521 2028 493 0.00 -2.10 2.40
10/06/14 Exelon Corp United States 2.2 -0.2 -10.9 19.1 19.8 47,849 46,748 59,621 26.27 28.04 8072 7880 34.07 22568 25793 11547 3336 3.80 24.80 1.70
04/06/15 Frontier Communications Corp United States 1 -3.1 -22.5 -23.5 -15.8 146,175 194,491 167,991 3.5 4.81 9380 1185 4.02 3507 5614 3275 1595 8.50 -10.10 5.40
28/03/11 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co United States -10.5 -12.4 -1.3 -14.9 -14.5 41,297 33,514 32,812 2.65 14.68 1491 1602 29.03 644 3920 11466 2555 0.90 26.20 1.20
10/02/05 Huntsman Corp United States 7 8.5 14.2 29.1 49.5 30,624 31,204 36,945 6.08 269 693 16.95 1142.7 1442 8052 1978 3.70 16.00 2.00
26/10/15 Kinder Morgan Inc United States -3.2 -11.7 0.5 -26.1 35.4 196,833 174,541 235,237 15.94 15.75 1243 4827 20.43 35514 35119 6452 1547 2.20 -156.70 0.70
19/11/14 Kindred Healthcare Inc United States -2.5 -6.3 -21.9 -32.5 -24 7,679 7,103 9,726 19.51 17.9 205.4 156.7 9.85 1260.3 1499.9 383.2 99.3 4.30 15.50 1.40
14/09/10 NextEra Energy Inc United States 1.6 2.8 -2 22.6 21.2 16,944 19,175 20,551 32.53 48.97 1501 6729 128 13529 22574 5327 960 2.50 23.30 0.70
01/05/12 NextEra Energy Inc United States 1.6 2.8 -2 22.6 21.2 16,944 19,175 20,551 35.92 48.97 1501 6729 128 14943 22574 5327 960 2.50 23.30 0.70
11/09/15 NextEra Energy Inc United States 1.6 2.8 -2 22.6 21.2 16,944 19,175 20,551 47.21 48.97 1501 6729 128 21338 22574 5327 960 2.50 23.30 0.70
26/01/06 NRG Energy Inc United States -10.6 -8.1 -25.6 -17.5 -9.7 62,833 56,402 59,678 11.22 8.62 3847 1567 10.63 1811 2707 10755 1756 3.10 -0.80 1.70
23/03/05 PNM Resources Inc United States 0.2 -2.4 -7 15.2 6 7,221 5,680 5,583 18.19 20.78 49.9 425.4 32.85 1099.6 1654.8 0 0 2.70 4,039.50 0.60
11/04/11 PPL Corp United States 1.5 -2.2 -10.3 -1.2 -0.4 39,447 53,274 45,525 16.98 14.72 836 3100 34.34 8210 9919 1659 311 4.00 14.50 0.70
26/01/05 Rite Aid Corp United States -5.8 -13.8 -5.3 -17.4 -17 211,707 209,299 142,278 -0.66 124.5 865.3 6.71 -342.5 581.4 22401.2 5971 0.00 57.60 1.50
16/08/05 Rite Aid Corp United States -5.8 -13.8 -5.3 -17.4 -17 211,707 209,299 142,278 -0.2 124.5 865.3 6.71 -104.3 581.4 22401.2 5971 0.00 57.60 1.50
14/01/15 Southwestern Energy Co United States -10.2 -24.8 -28.6 -12.2 36.3 237,373 183,542 166,367 12.16 5.85 18 1468 10.39 4293 2282 851 234 0.00 -1.20 0.60
10/09/15 Stericycle Inc United States 6.6 -0.5 -11.7 -35.8 -35.4 18,630 15,673 11,164 23.14 32.17 55.7 397.5 80.09 1962.7 2729.9 1658.1 510.9 0.00 29.10 1.30
22/09/09 Tenet Healthcare Corp United States -13.9 -10.6 -33.8 -39.1 -36.9 28,568 29,106 21,394 2.38 7.02 356 2664 19.71 286 691 11974 3089 0.00 -11.90 1.20
09/12/14 T-Mobile US Inc United States 5.6 5.6 6.5 30.1 26 69,189 46,474 38,736 17.99 20.23 7580 6581 49.73 14525 16557 14898 3975 0.00 29.60 1.60
30/07/14 Tyson Foods Inc United States 0.3 -6.6 -5.2 60.3 33.3 26,651 35,950 36,376 19.02 26.89 688 2198 70.85 6694 9691 36814 7957 0.80 16.00 1.50
22/02/11 Unisys Corp United States 2.9 7.8 6 -23.9 -7.7 12,112 8,115 7,778 -21.98 -27.85 365.2 70.6 10.45 -937.3 -1389.7 2294.1 522.8 0.00 -10.70 1.20
16/07/15 WPX Energy Inc United States -10.9 -14.3 13.1 57.3 88 68,858 67,746 100,258 21.28 11.61 414 366 10.86 4367 3196 293 144 0.00 -1.10 1.20










































































26/06/14 AmSurg Corp United States 333 368 1.55 8.70 1.71 1.71 1.65 2.16 3.30 87.29 57.75 2,567 2837.7 3,274,900 1,488.70 69
04/06/15 Anadarko Petroleum Corp United States -1,826 2,856 2,524 -0.28 Loss 1.53 -5.32 4.73 -4.65 -4.96 -10.24 72.24 28.16 9,486 7883 33,506,100 43,064.80 -2,354
06/01/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States 5.70 Neg. 5.87 8.89 -10.70 11.40 15.15 6.07 1,627 1822.8 331,490 915.20 -189
04/05/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States 5.70 Neg. 5.87 8.89 -10.70 11.40 15.15 6.07 1,627 1822.8 331,490 1,368.90 -189
10/07/12 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States -67 -56 8.89 Neg. -10.70 -24.69 -4.90 -2.77 11.40 15.15 6.07 1,627 1822.8 331,490 1,281.20 -205
14/09/06 Bristow Group Inc United States 91 134 141 1.32 18.20 1.84 1.77 2.29 2.58 2.84 -3.01 37.19 9.17 1,716 1617.9 352,390 814.00 63
27/06/06 Chesapeake Energy Corp United States na -14.42 8.15 1.50 12,140 10315 4,164,480 10,497.60 1,447
14/02/13 Cliffs Natural Resources Inc United States 1,038 1,544 2.55 25.90 2.57 4.76 1.63 6.40 0.26 8.45 1.20 2,013 1791.4 1,256,770 5,192.40 918
25/06/14 Dominion Resources Inc United States 3,363 4,765 4,598 3.16 -3.70 2.17 4.76 2.45 2.72 2.64 3.20 78.97 64.54 11,683 11046 45,883,590 40,937.90 1,581
07/10/14 Dynegy Inc United States -165 179 187 122.85 Neg. -933.66 -237.10 -1,656.02 -2.60 -2.65 -8.23 22.01 7.20 3,676 4153 1,257,330 3,138.90 -260
10/06/14 Exelon Corp United States 3,715 5,759 4.13 -15.50 4.09 3.87 3.75 2.11 1.33 37.70 25.09 29,447 30187 30,707,960 30,063.90 1,813
04/06/15 Frontier Communications Corp United States 759 1,957 0.38 -43.00 0.23 0.15 0.13 0.04 -0.49 5.85 3.81 5,576 6800 4,610,170 5,096.80 39
28/03/11 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co United States 419 1,071 1,251 1.21 Neg. -1.86 0.65 -0.32 -0.89 -0.27 1.24 35.30 24.31 16,443 15480 7,293,800 3,563.90 -216
10/02/05 Huntsman Corp United States 359 896 na -1.43 0.85 18.12 7.46 10,299 9869 4,048,670 -228
26/10/15 Kinder Morgan Inc United States 3,633 5,880 4,722 0.70 10.00 -0.06 0.46 0.23 0.47 0.10 -0.16 27.78 11.20 14,401 13300 45,093,760 2,227.90 1,074
19/11/14 Kindred Healthcare Inc United States 101 263 1.46 Neg. 1.62 1.44 -1.16 -1.66 0.73 15.66 7.96 7,055 7225.5 771,540 1,287.10 -89
14/09/10 NextEra Energy Inc United States 3,170 5,057 5,491 2.46 16.50 2.29 3.23 3.27 4.53 4.96 5.59 131.98 96.19 17,486 16674 58,824,330 22,937.80 1,854
01/05/12 NextEra Energy Inc United States 3,313 5,157 3.23 9.20 3.27 4.07 3.97 4.59 5.59 131.98 96.19 17,486 16674 58,824,330 26,769.60 1,923
11/09/15 NextEra Energy Inc United States 5,342 8,101 8,457 3.97 13.30 4.74 4.59 4.56 6.54 6.97 5.59 131.98 96.19 17,486 16674 58,824,330 43,075.60 2,910
26/01/06 NRG Energy Inc United States 213 408 553 1.10 -26.00 1.35 26.24 0.33 0.19 -19.40 18.32 8.80 14,674 13318 3,351,430 3,928.60 77
23/03/05 PNM Resources Inc United States 189 321 1.29 2.60 1.69 2.51 1.07 0.01 36.15 26.56 1,439 1369.8 2,580,770 1,618.00 88
11/04/11 PPL Corp United States 1,813 2,593 1.92 3.10 2.29 2.63 2.47 2.17 2.60 39.92 32.08 7,669 7454 23,107,320 11,348.00 938
26/01/05 Rite Aid Corp United States 446 699 0.54 -24.00 -4.34 -5.15 -1.68 0.13 8.30 6.48 30,737 32638.3 6,849,390 1,858.60 109
16/08/05 Rite Aid Corp United States 401 645 -4.34 Pos. -5.15 -1.68 -0.31 0.13 8.30 6.48 30,737 32638.3 6,849,390 2,302.60 267
14/01/15 Southwestern Energy Co United States 1,322 2,231 1.64 7.00 -0.10 1.73 1.82 2.15 -11.62 15.59 5.00 2,924 2375 4,800,940 8,748.80 757
10/09/15 Stericycle Inc United States 511 620 578 2.03 14.50 2.39 2.69 3.08 3.49 3.12 2.75 128.94 72.89 2,986 3544.3 6,622,210 12,027.00 301
22/09/09 Tenet Healthcare Corp United States 746 1,126 1,038 -12.04 Pos. -15.40 -5.28 -7.40 1.92 0.92 -2.29 35.95 18.86 18,634 19630 1,905,030 2,812.70 227
09/12/14 T-Mobile US Inc United States 1,393 5,712 0.84 -35.00 0.98 1.08 1.64 0.15 1.58 51.65 33.23 32,053 35314 40,615,710 22,757.70 126
30/07/14 Tyson Foods Inc United States 1,532 2,001 1,878 0.24 84.20 -1.44 2.06 1.97 2.76 2.37 4.13 77.05 42.89 41,311 38196 21,145,440 13,305.60 988
22/02/11 Unisys Corp United States 325 575 558 -50.90 Pos. -8.10 -2.30 -3.60 3.85 2.97 -0.91 14.68 6.72 3,015 2888.9 510,850 1,596.30 167
16/07/15 WPX Energy Inc United States 492 1,376 1,228 0.69 22.40 -6.57 -1.53 -1.12 1.56 0.19 -7.84 13.92 2.53 1,470 1099 3,715,380 2,277.40 318
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26/06/14 AmSurg Corp United States 573 46.228 1.9 32,505,000 32,505,000 0 6,547 2,184 2,294 1,082
04/06/15 Anadarko Petroleum Corp United States -1,731 -21.519 2.64 507,900,000 508,000,000 100,000 46,414 52,973 12,819 14,622
06/01/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States 52 0.93 198,966,580 198,966,580 0 2,096 2,022 630 1,005
04/05/10 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States 52 1.39 198,966,580 198,966,580 0 2,096 2,022 630 1,005
10/07/12 Beazer Homes USA Inc United States 52 -36.101 1.29 377,941,980 377,941,980 0 2,096 1,975 630 742
14/09/06 Bristow Group Inc United States 45 19.38 1.41 23,385,473 23,491,378 105,905 3,204 1,240 1,499 809
27/06/06 Chesapeake Energy Corp United States -718 1.91 361,364,831 361,364,831 0 17,357 18,052 2,138 5,826 B1
14/02/13 Cliffs Natural Resources Inc United States 130 3.906 0.82 142,491,645 142,491,645 0 2,136 14,685 -1,981 5,642
25/06/14 Dominion Resources Inc United States 3,564 36.742 3.5 582,000,000 583,000,000 1,000,000 58,797 50,586 12,664 13,227
07/10/14 Dynegy Inc United States 94 -38.462 1.53 100,382,015 124,436,941 24,054,926 11,539 4,981 2,921 2,022
10/06/14 Exelon Corp United States 4,391 47.432 1.33 859,000,000 859,000,000 0 95,384 79,468 25,986 26,043 Baa3
04/06/15 Frontier Communications Corp United States 981 2544.529 1.45 1,003,308,000 1,002,469,000 -839,000 27,084 18,721 5,614 4,989
28/03/11 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co United States 1,547 -56.18 5.53 242,938,949 244,144,455 1,205,506 14,298 15,572 3,920 18,832 B1 B2 B3
10/02/05 Huntsman Corp United States 706 -34.965 0 0 9,402 9,886 1,442 11,486
26/10/15 Kinder Morgan Inc United States 4,511 105.422 0.06 2,227,894,462 2,229,223,864 1,329,402 78,781 80,350 35,119 14,678
19/11/14 Kindred Healthcare Inc United States 295 -60.274 1.02 64,612,000 64,612,000 0 6,415 4,025 1,500 5,001
14/09/10 NextEra Energy Inc United States 4,660 22.075 1.7 415,841,893 418,420,348 2,578,455 82,479 51,209 22,574 14,847
01/05/12 NextEra Energy Inc United States 4,660 20.697 1.79 416,000,000 416,000,000 0 82,479 57,188 22,574 14,827
11/09/15 NextEra Energy Inc United States 4,660 15.282 2.02 452,000,000 461,000,000 9,000,000 82,479 77,201 22,574 17,781
26/01/06 NRG Energy Inc United States 979 757.576 4.34 80,701,888 68,487,638 -12,214,250 32,715 7,405 3,009 2,708
23/03/05 PNM Resources Inc United States 292 1.47 60,464,595 60,464,595 0 6,009 3,416 1,666
11/04/11 PPL Corp United States 2,831 46.083 1.49 448,538,509 448,538,509 0 39,301 32,837 9,919 8,907 Baa3
26/01/05 Rite Aid Corp United States 813 -5.43 520,602,938 520,602,938 0 9,738 5,678 581 16,872 Caa2 Caa1
16/08/05 Rite Aid Corp United States 813 -22.07 520,952,399 520,952,399 0 9,738 5,848 581 16,794 Caa2 Caa1
14/01/15 Southwestern Energy Co United States -64 23.276 2.03 354,489,342 353,125,665 -1,363,677 8,110 9,177 2,282 3,939
10/09/15 Stericycle Inc United States 661 28.62 6.12 84,960,791 84,942,134 -18,657 7,078 4,527 2,730 2,724
22/09/09 Tenet Healthcare Corp United States 1,494 520.833 2.46 480,800,029 481,100,028 299,999 22,906 7,928 691 8,735
09/12/14 T-Mobile US Inc United States 1,902 342.466 1.57 807,297,844 807,297,844 0 62,436 55,115 16,557 28,237
30/07/14 Tyson Foods Inc United States 2,140 36.295 1.99 352,000,000 376,000,000 24,000,000 23,004 12,055 9,691 36,379
22/02/11 Unisys Corp United States -55 25.974 -1.7 42,648,839 43,033,189 384,350 2,029 2,841 -1,390 4,020
16/07/15 WPX Energy Inc United States -656 32.161 0.52 204,800,000 275,300,000 70,500,000 8,350 7,962 3,535 1,868
